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ABSTRACT
This study examines the symbiotic relationship between labor relations and the resilience
and performance of regional economies. I hypothesize that the institutional structure of the
recent phenomenon of Chinese Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) creates opportunities
for industrial labor relations that contribute to their economic performance. I conduct two case
studies, first the experiences of the Monongahela (Mon) Valley steel industry in the United
States in the mid-i 980s and then the more recent experiences of the Shanxi Province
cokemaking sector in rural China in the late-i 990s to early 2000s. They illustrate the
mechanisms through which the cultural, social, economic and industrial environments influence
labor market practices, which in turn affect the regional economy.
I propose that sour labor relations were partly responsible for the economic and social
deterioration of the Mon Valley. Then, I claim that the unique institutional environments in
which Chinese TVEs operate are conducive to positive labor-management relations and labor
practices that render these enterprises competitive in the global economy. An agrarian culture,
the prevalence of dense social networks in the form of guanxi, and the nature and structure of the
firms all contribute to the Shanxi Cokemaking TVEs' competitive advantage. To conduct this
study, I review existing literature and research studies, official statistics, as well as use empirical
plant-level survey data and make site visits.
I conclude that there is room for experimental labor relations that can be growth and
labor-friendly. As a developing country, China has much to learn from the industrialization and
de-industrialization processes of her Western counterparts, such as the United States. At the
same time, U.S. management and workers may also benefit from learning about the TVE
experience. The deep-seeded social capital and emphasis on long-term harmonious
relationships should allow Chinese management and workers in the quickly industrializing
countryside to create an innovative, cooperative forum of interactions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since their inception during the Chinese economic reforms in the late 1970s, Township
and Village Enterprises (TVEs) have demonstrated increasing productivity and competitiveness.
Ironically, TVE employees often experience lower wages and fewer benefits compared to the
larger, more formal state-owned enterprises. In addition, workers at TVEs are mostly peasants
from rural areas with little industrial experience. What, then, constitutes the high degree of
industrial competitiveness and productivity in these organizations? I hypothesize that it is the
nature of China's rural labor market and the social capital embedded within the TVEs that give
these enterprises a competitive advantage. Putnam (2001) found empirical evidence that social
connectedness in the United States is a strong predictor of altruistic behavior. Along similar
lines, I claim that social connectedness within TVEs is correlated with workers' and
management's willingness to be flexible and perhaps even sacrifice profits and/or incomes in the
short run to foster long-term competitiveness. I examine how culture, society, and business
decisions influence labor relations, and how labor relations, in turn, affect regional growth and
competitiveness.
Research Questions and Rationale
My hypothesis is that the institutional structure of Chinese TVEs creates opportunities for
favorable industrial labor relations. These relations allow TVEs the flexibilities to compete
competitively in the domestic and global markets. I began this exercise with a broad interest in
the roles that labor and industrial relations play in a region's economic development and decline.
I propose that a symbiotic relationship exists between workers' welfare (a function of their
safety, health, wages, employment status, bargaining power, satisfaction, etc.) and an industry's
competitiveness, and I will explain and describe how it is so. (Figure 1.1) How do industrial
labor relations evolve throughout a region's industrialization process? What factors and
industry/institutional characteristics influence and define these relations?
More specifically, I am interested in the nature of industrial labor relations in China's
new and somewhat amorphous set of institutions that make up the Township and Village
Enterprises. I will examine how the unique nature of the TVEs has, or can, foster industrial labor
relations and labor practices that enhance industry competitiveness. I will also look at how these
relations change as TVEs evolve and grow and speculate what is going to happen to the future of
workers as China's countryside industrializes and urbanizes. Will China experience similar
adversarial interactions between management and laborers in the metallurgical sector much like
the Pennsylvania experience? I hypothesize that a new paradigm of labor relations can emerge
from the TVE experience.
The analytical framework I use for this study is unique. Through looking at the
symbiotic relationship between regional economic growth and industrial relations, I analyze the
current and future state and functions of industrial labor relations in the TVE context. I review
and analyze three major topic areas to support my hypothesis. First, I turn to the development
experience in the Pennsylvania coal/cokemaking/iron and steel making industry. I analyze the
specific historical and institutional factors that affect industrial labor relations and how labor
relations, in turn, affected economic performance over the course of development in the
metallurgical sector and the region. I focus on the case of the integrated steel plants in the
Monongahela Valley in the 1980s for analyzing the institutional factors at play. Second, I
analyze industrial relations in the context of Chinese TVEs, using the Shanxi cokemaking TVEs
as examples. Industrial relations include how work is organized within the plant, employment
practices and job training, and the interactions between workers and management. Finally, I
explore how industrial labor relations may evolve as TVEs undergo structural changes. The
questions that I pose include: (1) As China quickly industrializes, how do firms handle their
workforce and maintain their industrial relations? (2) Can China learn from the experiences of
the United States, or vice versa? (3) What are TVEs capable of accomplishing in terms of
seeking new paradigms for management and labor practices? Can their ambiguous property
rights definitions and evolving nature be a new opportunity for organizing production and create
a new forum of interaction between workers and industries? The results of my analyses could be
useful to policy analysts, planners, labor organizations, firms, and institutional reformists in
China as well as other countries across the development spectrum.
Methodology
I obtain support for my hypotheses using a case-study approach. For the case of the
Monongahela Valley, I first analyze historical industrial-labor relations in Pennsylvania using
secondary sources. These include literature on the subject and published interviews with
workers. I also interviewed Professor Robert McKersie, who participated in the steel industry
labor negotiations in the 1980s. To study the Shanxi cokemaking region, I use notes and
interviews collected at visits to six cokemaking TVEs conducted by the Alliance for Global
Sustainability's China Coke Project research team in the summer of 2001. I also review what
various scholars have written on TVEs and Chinese labor relations since the economic reforms in
the late 1970s. For further analyses of the nature, structure, and institutional evolution of the
TVEs, I turn to figures and information published in the Township and Village Enterprise
Yearbooks (published by the Chinese Statistics Bureau) and other published statistics. I use data
from four Alliance for Global Sustainability (AGS) China Cokemaking Project surveys on SOEs
and TVEs (1998- 2001) to examine practices within State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and TVEs.
The surveys contain questions on the enterprises' employment practices, ownership structure,
and supply-chain relationships. There were two surveys conducted in a total of around 300
cokemaking TVEs (1998 and 2000) and two surveys on 40+ SOEs (1999 and 2001). For
descriptive statistics and comparison between TVEs and SOEs, I use the entire samples of the
surveys. There were 31 cokemaking TVEs that participated in both the 1998 and 2000 surveys.
I use the matched sample to look at the changes and evolution of practices within the
cokemaking enterprises between the years.
Preview of Study
My study focuses on industrial labor relations in cokemaking township and village
enterprises in Shanxi Province, China. Based on the experience in the Pennsylvania coal-based
industrial region and theories relating social capital and the work place, I hypothesize that the
evolving institutional structure of Chinese TVEs creates opportunities for industrial labor
relations that increase industrial and regional competitiveness. To that end, I describe the
Pennsylvania case using secondary sources and present various theories and evidences from both
economic reform and social capital literature. I also focus on the case of cokemaking TVEs in
Shanxi Province using empirical survey data and on-site interviews with plant managers. This
exercise is an attempt to provide information on (1) Ways in which Chinese TVEs handle their
workforce and maintain their industrial relations as the country quickly industrializes; (2) What
China can learn from the experiences of the United States and what the rest of the world can
learn from the TVEs' experiences; and (3) The potential of TVEs to develop into an innovative
production organization and to create a new forum of interaction among workers and industries.
The organization of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 is an overview of theories and
hypotheses on the topic of industrial labor relations. Chapter 3 is a case study of the
Pennsylvania steel region in the 1980s, where I closely examine the labor factors that contributed
to the rapid regional economic decline and social deterioration in the Monongahela Valley.
Chapter 4 describes the recently invented Township and Village Enterprises in China. I
postulate how this institution provides an opportunity for management practices and labor
relations that can foster regional competitiveness. Chapter 5 is a case study of the cokemaking
sector in Shanxi Province, China. I compare cokemaking TVEs cross-sectionally with state-
owned enterprises, as well as among TVEs under various types of ownership. I also examine
cokemaking TVEs longitudinally to uncover their evolution over time. Finally, in Chapter 6, I
conclude with analyses of the evidence and point to future research and policy opportunities.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND: THE TOPIC OF LABOR AND LABOR RELATIONS
I have chosen to examine the roles that labor and labor relations play in regional
economic growth. Why labor? As development planners, we must be cognizant of the questions,
"Development for what? For whom?" As people are both drivers and beneficiaries of regional
economic activities, I find it important to examine the symbiotic influences of growth and
industrial relations, labor welfare, and human development. Work is an enabling process
(Ashford, 2/1/2002). Employment is the means through which we become self-sufficient, the
pathway towards realization of capacities and possibilities. Workers are at the same time
economic, social, and political animals. In this light, laborers are not just another factor input for
production. The creation of employment and development of human capital are both the process
towards the goal of economic advancement, as well as end goals in themselves. I attempt to
uncover how laborers fare vis-a-vis regional development.
In this chapter, I give an overview of various theories and analyses of the philosophies
and practices of labor management and industrial labor relations. Specifically, I indicate the
differences between Chinese and Western styles and mentalities regarding labor and human
resources.
Industrial Labor Relations
Labor is a crucial factor of production that fuels any economic growth. The management
of labor hence deserves special attention when we try to analyze and understand the rise and
decline of regional economies. Gospel (1983) divided labor management into three categories:
work relations, employment relations, and industrial relations.
Work relations refer to the ways work is organized and the development of workers
around the prevailing technologies and production processes. Employment relations
cover the various personnel management practices, such as recruitment, training,
remuneration and work conditions. Industrial relations is concerned with the collective
representation of workers through union organization and management's dealings with
unions through joint consultation and collective bargaining (Benson et al., 2000, p. 80).
Gospels' distinctions are somewhat arbitrary, and the three different areas certainly intertwine
and influence one another. For the purpose of this thesis, I use the term "labor relations" to
include all three aspects of labor management.
Theories and Hypotheses
In the following section, I examine some of the theories of management and various
hypotheses regarding labor and labor relations that are particularly salient to the Chinese
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs).
Employment
Even within the more developed capitalist economies, the notions and mentalities
regarding work and employment vary. Michel Albert (1999) sees the North Atlantic economies
as having rival systems of employment. In the Anglo-American model (U.S. and U.K.),
companies maximize their competitiveness by sharpening competition between individual
employees. This leads to a relentless drive to recruit the best and the brightest personnel and to
pay them the market-dictated costs in order to keep them. Under this system, salaries are
individualized and highly negotiable. On the other hand, in Germany and Japan, employees are
viewed differently (the Rhine-Japanese model). Rather than being substitutable factor inputs, the
"company as community" feels obligated to provide job security and educational and training
opportunities. As a result of the extra costs of providing training, the Rhine-Japanese firms may
not be able to pay workers their market values, but instead guarantee job security and assistance
for "smoothing out the rough spots along the way" (Albert, 1994, p. 117). Due to the cultural
proximity between China and Japan, and the community nature of the township and village
enterprises, I expect Chinese TVEs to resemble more closely the Rhine-Japanese mentality of
employment than the Anlgo-American model.
Theories of Management
In the 1950s, theorist Douglas McGregor developed two concepts of management.
Theory X assumes that the average human being dislikes work, hence tries to avoid it. Based on
this theory, management should adopt an authoritarian style of command. On the other hand,
Theory Y assumes that workers want to be committed to their work, so that a participatory style
of management is most appropriate (Hoerr, 1988). Depending on the framework from which
managers come, their management mindset and practices would differ, resulting in very different
natures of industrial labor relationships. Traditionally, the Anglo-American managers adopted
Theory X as their management philosophy, resulting in adversity in management-workers
relations.
The Collective-Bargaining Tradition
Developed as early as 1914 (by Beatrice and Sidney Webb), collective bargaining was
conceptualized by Western main-stream industrial relations theorists as a key institution that
helps integrate and stabilize labor-management relations in capitalist economies (Ng and Warner,
2000). After World War II, collective-bargaining norms shifted to focus on plant-specific
productivity deals, later giving way to a type of performance-oriented, incentive-based form of
managerial control (Ng and Warner, 2000).
Defined as such, notions of collective bargaining are rather foreign to Chinese
enterprises. The Chinese practice of collective bargaining is heavily influenced by the state,
hence a "unitarist system" that is devoid of self-determination. The Labor Law and local
regulations govern the negotiation and making of the collective contract and prescribe and
structure bargaining processes that are consistent across enterprises (Ng and Warner, 2000).
Under such an institutional infrastructure, the contentions and frustrations that Western industrial
workers experience may manifest themselves differently in the Chinese setting. Without
representative labor unions (a collective voice), the arena in which labor and management
interact are also quite dissimilar.
The Employment-Technology Tradeoff
Reforming labor-market institutions during a time of rapid economic growth and
technological advances, the managers of Chinese enterprises are faced with trade-off options
between technology and employment. Benson et al. (2000) suggest that to improve labor
flexibility, Chinese managers can choose between empowering workers or containing them.
Empowering workers involves granting them autonomy and re-training so that functional
flexibility within the enterprises can be achieved; containing workers, on the other hand, requires
introduction of a new technology to limit the amount of human involvement in the work process,
thereby deskilling workers and reinforcing hierarchical control.
The Regional Hypothesis
The relationship between industry and its locale can affect the interactions among its
workers and residents. Industrial regions often arise from a certain industry base. In the United
States, as well as in other capitalist countries, individual firms may create or dominate a
community economically. In these "company towns," employment, the local tax base, and
property values all depend on the activities of the firm. The company may even influence the
selection of public officials. Companies in effect "own" the town, as opposed to the reverse
(Gelb and Svejnar, 1990). Such dynamics between town and firms can create social tension. In
Chapter 3, I describe how this tension manifests itself into sour labor relations in the
Pennsylvania steel towns in the United States. These cases where companies essentially control
the towns in which they operate are the opposite of what I predict in community enterprises.
Chinese TVEs are often collectively owned by members of the community. Regional industrial
development on a community basis reduces the risk of investment flight. According to Gelb and
Svejnar, some communities that have suffered from departures of firms, or that recognize their
vulnerability to important company decisions, have attempted to attract and develop industry on
a community basis. Successful worker and community mobilizations of this type not only yield
economic benefits, but also give the community greater control over local businesses. In
unsuccessful cases, however, the community may actually be worse off (Gelb and Svejnar,
1990).
The Cultural Hypothesis
Chinese and Western styles and philosophies of management differ. Therefore, labor
relations and management must be understood in their cultural and historical contexts. These
differences have often been influenced through economic development, historical experience,
and ideology (Stewart and Stewart, 1996). Stewart and Stewart propose that the three schools of
Classical Chinese thought (Confucius, Han Fei Zi, and Sun Zi) exert direct and indirect
influences on the Chinese style of management and labor relations. The underlying assumption
in Confucius' Analects (Lun Yu) is that man is good by nature, and this concept of virtue
pervades in Chinese human resource management (Stewart and Stewart, 1996). This notion of
the virtuous man and the moral leader, for example, is rather different from Douglas McGregor's
Theory X and its subsequent prescription for labor management. Although Sun Zi (circa 5th
Century B.C.) in his book Bing Fa (The Art of War), concentrated primarily on war tactics, an
underlying philosophy of Sun Zi is that "invincibility depends upon ourselves." Hence, discipline
and training are important (Stewart and Stewart, 1996). This emphasis on training can have
significant labor-market implications.
As one of the most long-standing and influential schools of Chinese thought, Confucius
regards the family as the core unit in one's social sphere. During the Chinese economic reforms
of 1979, which broke up agricultural communes in favor of family land holdings, the old family-
based values were reinforced. The end result of this change was that economic life was
organized around family units (Redding, 1996). Coincidentally, families privately own a
majority of the township and village enterprises in rural China. I therefore postulate that the
TVEs would follow rather Confucian styles of business and labor management. The
fundamental belief that people are good by nature would lead to more cooperative and horizontal
styles of management. However, as TVEs themselves are rapidly undergoing institutional and
management changes (e.g., TVEs are increasingly "going public"), management tactics and
business philosophies may also evolve.
The Social Political Hypotheses
According to The Dynamics ofIndustrial Democracy, the social environment of a
community has a deep and lasting effect on the climate and practice of labor relations in the
community. Golden and Ruttenburg argued that the "dominant social influence" in a community
"have a far greater effect on the state on industrial peace" than collective bargaining (discussed
in Hoerr, 1988, p. 184).
Industrial relations and employment issues were an important area of propaganda in the
founding of the New China in the mid-20th Century (Warner and Zhu, 2000):
In answer to the question, "What does socialism bring to people?" Qu (1950,
p.34) claimed that the most important issue was the "right to work" (gongzuo
quan) and "full employment" (quanmin jiuye). It was even written into the
Constitution of the PRC (xianfa) (Article 42: PRC citizens have the right and
responsibility to work). These rights were an essential part of the "social
contract" made at the time in order to protect the rights of the "new Chinese
Worker" (Korzec, 1992, p. 48).
As a socialist country, a labor-friendly ideology regarding work should prevail in China.
However, under rapid economic reforms, it is interesting to note how political ideology
succumbs to capitalist market pressures.
Cokemaking TVEs in Shanxi Province are located in rural areas, on former farmlands.
Almost all of the plant workers are peasants who come from nearby villages, often the same ones
from where plant managers and the managerial staff come (AGS Field Notes, 2001). Analysts
Weitzman and Xu considered The Folk Theorem and suggested that
the outcome of a repeated non-cooperative game played among sufficiently
patient players may look as if it is the outcome of some cooperative process or
some legally binding agreement to play cooperatively, or, it may not. It all
depends upon an intangible expectation factor that might legitimately be
identified with the history or culture of the group of players. ... for each member
of the group expects that every other member of the group will play
cooperatively, then the cooperative solution may become a self-reinforcing
equilibrium. (Weitzman and Xu, 1994, p. 137)
If social interactions inside a TVE could be seen as repeated games, and workers and managers
the players, then the pre-existence of long-term, persistent social ties constitutes the "history and
culture" that sets up expectations. Based on such expectations, players have an incentive to
participate cooperatively.
I speculate that all three forces (employment as political ideology, agrarian culture, and
rural social networks) influence the degree of social solidarity in TVEs and translate into
favorable management and labor-relations practices.
The Work-Ethic Hypothesis
Weber defines work ethics as "an obligation which the individual is supposed to feel and
does feel towards the content of his professional activity, no matter [of] what it consists." Hard
work, diligence, and industriousness are then behavioral indicators and measurements of the
work ethic (discussed in Levin and Yeung, 1996, p. 136).
Culture and historical experiences are sure to influence work ethics and people's attitude
towards work and management. In this light, Chinese societies have characteristically
emphasized diligence and industriousness (Levin and Yeung, 1996).
The Ownership Hypotheses
Benson, Debroux, and Yuasa (2000) conducted case studies of 14 Shanghai fmns to look
at employment and work relations in companies under different ownership structures. Their
study consisted of interviews with managers and union leaders and collection of company
documents. They found that economic restructuring in China impacted the nature of the form of
labor management. Employment relations in the companies that they studied demonstrated
differences from the Western Fordist approach. One salient difference is the nature of trade and
labor unions. In China, the role of trade unions is to assist management in achieving a
productive enterprise, and they do not partake in functions such as wage and benefits bargaining.
They observed that Chinese enterprises are willing to install new technology to increase
flexibility. They also discovered, however, that despite their willingness to empower their
workforce, management created few opportunities to encourage workers to become more flexible
and committed. They conclude that labor relations in their case studies were halfway between
the old communist approach and the idealized form of Human-Resource Management (HRM).
HRM is a western adaptation of a Japanese management philosophy that "nurturing people as a
resource is a precondition to corporate success" (Chan, 2000, p. 43).
Chan's (2000) field work also indicated that ownership structure is correlated with
workplace relations. For Western joint ventures in China (which are often the bigger, more
capital-intensive, and more high-tech companies), there has recently been an embrace of
Japanese-influenced HRM. Her interviews in Northern Chinese joint-ventures revealed that
management tried to put this management philosophy into practice in the hopes of maintaining a
stable workforce and to keep up work incentives (Chan, 2000). On the other hand, she observed
a different style of management among Asian joint ventures and indigenous private enterprises
(which are often smaller, rural, family-run). The ownership of these enterprises suggests that the
management has had little management experience, and little background in negotiation with
trade unions (Chan, 2000). What Chan found were overwhelmingly authoritarian patterns of
management, characterized by long work days, low pay, poor and unsafe working conditions,
and low-skill, repetitive tasks.
The Employment Hypothesis
Political pressures exist in creating non-farm employment in rural communities. In fact,
this is often claimed as a motive for community governments to develop TVEs (Jin and Qian,
1998). Reducing rural unemployment is of urgent policy concern, for labor cannot freely move
from rural to urban areas.1 In the countryside, special relationships exist between local and
regional governments. The special ties to local governments make TVEs better able to mobilize
capital than private enterprises, thus they may bring in more capital investments, leading to more
non-farm employment opportunities (Jin and Qian, 1998). According to Zhang and Ronnas
(1996), private enterprises have much lower capital-labor ratios than SOEs and TVEs, and hence
can provide even more employment opportunities for any given level of capital investment (Jin
and Qian, 1998).
Jin and Qian (1998) empirically tested the relationship between ownership and
employment in rural China, based on provincial data from 1986 to 1993. They found that the
TVEs' share in rural enterprise employment had a positive effect on the share of rural non-farm
employment in the total rural labor force, suggesting that TVEs are better at creating non-farm
employment opportunities than private enterprises, despite private enterprises having lower
capital-labor ratios. Jin and Qian explain their findings by suggesting that the lack of access to
capital sufficiently hinders private enterprises' ability to generate non-farm employment. On the
other hand, where capital is scarce and labor is abundant, the TVE effectively creates
employment (Jin and Qian, 1998).
'According to Vernon Henderson, restrictive internal migration policy (the Hukou system) has created a surplus of
labor in agriculture and led to insufficient agglomeration of economic activity within both rural and urban areas. He
recommends that for rural areas huge productivity gains could be achieved if the population was allowed to migrate
to cities freely (Henderson, 2002).
Conclusion
Despite the universal agreement on the importance of work and employment,
management theories and labor practices differ across regions, and are specific to cultural,
historical, economic, and political settings. I have reviewed some of the theories and research
findings by other analysts who took an interest in the subject matter, and present here some of
the hypotheses that are salient when examining rural China's transition from peasantry to
industry. In Chapter 3, I present the case of the Monongahela steel region in the United States in
the 1980s and look at how theories and hypotheses can be applied during a time of regional
economic slump. In Chapter 5, I use the case of the TVE cokemaking sector in Shanxi Province,
China, as a testing ground for the aforementioned theories and hypotheses in the context of a
developing and transitional economy.
CHAPTER 3
PENNSYLVANIA STEEL INDUSTRY IN THE 1980s
To demonstrate how industrial labor relations influence firms' flexibility in the face of
market changes, I employ the experience of the Pennsylvania steel industry in the 1980s as a
case study.2 I use the experience of the United States' Monongahela Valley (Mon Valley) as a
reference point from which to think about the development of China's Shanxi Province.
Generally regarded as a steel region, a substantial amount of cokemaking activities happened in
Pennsylvania within the highly vertically integrated iron and steel industry. I therefore consider
Pennsylvania and Shanxi Province to be comparable in terms of economic base, and in their
respective roles in their countries' overall industrialization.
Although early industrialization in the Pennsylvania region gave rise to strong labor
voices (Sheppard, 1947), Hoerr (1988) attributed the rapid decline of its steel industry in the
1980s to "an obsolete and adversarial relationship between management and labor" that "made it
impossible for the industry to adapt to shattering changes in the global economy" (Hoerr, 1998,
cover). Because the metallurgical sector was the dominant industry in the region, hiring the
majority of the workforce, the decline of the steel sector led to overall deterioration of the
region's economic and social fabric (Hoerr, 1988). I believe that the highly unionized steel labor
force and their hostile relationship with the industries and employers affected the region's
economic competitiveness.
2 A large part of this chapter appeared, with a slightly different focus, in the term paper titled "When the Better got
Worse, Would the Worse get Better: Industrial Labor Relations and Pennsylvania's Steel Region in the 1980s,"
which was submitted to Professor Paul Osterman for his Urban Labor Markets and Policies class in the Fall of 2001,
at MIT's Department of Urban Studies and Planning.
Using secondary sources, I present a case study of the waning steel industry and
communities and the role of labor in the regional economic demise. I first provide a background
on the U.S. steel industry and describe the Mon Valley labor market between WWII and the
1980s, followed by an analysis of how the bustling steel region encountered severe troubles
starting in the early 1980s. I focus specifically on the role of industrial relations in affecting the
fate of the industry. I then describe the solutions and coping mechanisms that the workers and
management in the steel industry developed in order to salvage its competitiveness. I proceed to
discuss whether the worsening old-world labor-market norms and business practices in the Mon
Valley steel sector did change for the better during the 1980s.
Rationale
The purpose of this case study is to examine ways in which labor relations play a role in
the economic resilience of a region. I choose to look at the steel labor market in the Mon Valley
during a period of economic difficulty and transition for various reasons. First, the Mon Valley
had an interesting labor market where one industry served as the primary employer. This created
a certain tenuous relationship between people in the community and industrialists. Second, the
Pittsburgh steel area was the breeding ground for the labor movements in the United States,
giving rise to some of the strongest and most powerful unions. Third, the U.S. steel workers
have been among the most productive in the world. Although this should give them a
competitive advantage internationally, as well as the power to bargain with the management, this
power could both help and hurt them in the long run. Fourth, the decline of the steel industry in
the 1980s greatly deteriorated the communities in the Mon Valley region in both economic and
social terms. These communities had been intimately tied to the steel industry. As Hoerr (1988)
observed in the late 1980s, "The mill towns, once so alive with the heavy throb of industry, now
gave off the weak pulse of welfare and retirement communities. The degree of suffering caused
by lost jobs, mortgage foreclosures, suicides, broken marriages, and alcoholism was beyond
calculation" (Hoerr, 1988, p. 145). The Mon Valley case, then, serves as an intriguing example
of the symbiotic relationship between the economy, politics, and social welfare of a region.
Also, the fact that the Pittsburgh area suffered more than other steel regions in the country,
despite similar macroeconomic, political, and technology constraints makes targeting the labor
dimension of the steel industry particularly interesting. Finally, the Mon Valley serves as a good
reference point from which to look at and analyze industrialization and labor relations in Shanxi
Province, China, due to the similar economic bases of the two regions.
Background
In this section, I outline the backdrop against which industrialization and labor issues
came into being in the Monongahela (Mon) Valley region in Pennsylvania.
The U.S. Steel Industry
The U.S. Steel industry has been a dominant player in the global market, and the
Monongahela Valley has historically been the steel capital of the world. The industry reached its
peak in 1974 with more than $32.2 billion in sales. However, by 1998, the U.S. steel market was
only one-third of its size in 1974. Total steel production in the country dropped from 150.8
million tons in 1973 to 105 million tons in 1996 (Antonelli, 1998,
http://pittsburgh.bcentral.com/pittsburgh/stories/1998/03/16/focusl.html). An acute decline in
U.S. steel production took place between 1981 and 1982; the dwindling production level was
accompanied by a steady increase in imports of foreign steel (Figure 3.1). This trend has long-
term implications. By 2001, the U.S. steel industry again fell into crisis. Many steel plants could
no longer compete internationally and declared bankruptcy as a result of cheap foreign imports.
The decline in steel production led to declines in the labor market. The 232,000 wage and salary
jobs in the U.S. steel industry in 2001 was at half of its 1980 level (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2001).
In Pennsylvania, the decline in steel employment was even more pronounced. The total
number of employees in the Blast Furnace and Steel Mills sector (SIC 3312) in the United States
dropped from 296 thousands in 1982 to 171 thousands in 1992 (42% decrease); during the same
period, blast furnace and steel mill employment fell from 73 thousands to 35 thousands in
Pennsylvania, meaning half of the steel workers lost their jobs within ten years. By the year
2000, there were a total of 63 thousand steel workers in the United States, among which nine
thousand worked in Pennsylvania. Steel employment in Pennsylvania shrank by about 90% in
the course of 20 years (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1983, 1993, 2002). Prior to the 1970s,
steel in the United States had been traditionally produced in integrated mills, making steel from
iron ore. Integrated mills enjoyed economies of scale.
Technological advances and demand for specialized steel products, however, encouraged
the development of electric-powered mini-mills that use scrap metal for production. Small-sized
mini-mills produced specialized steel products, e.g. rods and wires. Their process of production
had cost advantages in raw materials and energy over the integrated mills (Rubinstein, 2001).
Mini-mills rapidly proliferated towards the end of the 1970s. These mills were characteristically
non-unionized, and enjoyed high output per man-hour, high-yielding incentive pay plans, and
efficient work practices. Between the 1960s and 1982, the mini-mills' market share grew from
3% to 18% (Hoerr, 1988). By 2001, mini-mills accounted for 48% of the U.S. steel market (U.S
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001).
Steel and Labor Market in The Monongahela Valley
The Monongahela Valley in southwestern Pennsylvania was the U.S. steel capital, largely
due to its proximity to coal reserves. The steel industry, which included operations in coal
mining and cokemaking, was the predominant employer of manufacturing workers in the Mon
Valley. Prior to the 1980s, the industry was an oligopoly dominated by eight major firms with
integrated plants. The fate of the communities, then, was closely linked to the economic well-
being of the steel industry.
The very nature of the Monongahela steel sector created an imperfect labor market. According
to census data, in 1981, the steel industry accounted for about 7% of Pennsylvania's total
employment. The eight dominant steel firms had the power to collude and consolidate demand
for steelworkers, creating downward pressures on employment and depressed wage rates.
Moreover, having the power to collude made it beneficial for steel producers to handle labor
relations in a monopolistic manner. The steel industry had an industry-wide bargaining setup,
where the large companies crowded under U.S. Steel's umbrella to protect themselves from
being picked off by unions in single-firm strikes. In return, they permitted U.S. Steel (USS) to
assume command in collective bargaining and to enforce the resulting uniformity in costs. This
enabled USS to prevent its less efficient competitors from gaining advantages through lower
labor costs and in some cases eliminated cost efficiencies at the smaller firms (Hoerr, 1988).
Work in coal-based industries is characterized by hard work and adverse conditions. The
intense heat in the foundries, the heavy machinery and the demand on physical strength make
employment in the coal-based sectors dangerous and difficult. In such an environment, the work
environment of the industries, labor rights, job security, safety, and decision-making power are
of special policy and economic concerns. The Pennsylvania coal and steel region is regarded as
the birthplace of organized labor. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded in
Allegheny County in 1881 (Hoerr, 1988). The Steelworkers Organizing Committee (SWOC)
began in 1936 in Pittsburgh to organize the steel industry. SWOC eventually became the United
Steelworkers of America (USWA) in 1942 (Hathaway, 1993). USWA broadened its jurisdiction
to include allied ferrous and non-ferrous metals producing and fabricating industries (United
Steelworkers of America, 2002). As a result of the strong union presence, workers in the area
enjoyed higher wages, better benefits and more power than their counterparts in other parts of the
United States and the world.
Census data between the late 1970s and the late 1990s show that U.S. steel workers have
been increasingly productive over time. The "value added per production worker per hour" has
risen steadily during the time span, whereas average hourly earnings have not changed much
(Figure 3.2). In large part, the America steel workers' productivity was associated with the use
of state-of-the-art production machinery and automation technology. During the 1980s, USS
raised productivity by closing down its older mills and laying off thousands of workers, leading
to higher productivity among the mills that remained open (Hathaway, 1993). In 1977, the value-
added per steel employee hour was $23 (nominal value), and rose to $60 by 1988 (U.S. Census
Bureau, 1997). By 2000, U.S. steelworkers were the most productive among key steel-exporting
countries. Labor productivity averaged 3.7 hours per short ton of steel, compared to 4.2 hours in
Canada, and 19.8 hours in China (United Steel Workers of America, 2001b). All else being
equal, however, Robert McKersie (12/12/2001) believes that steel workers had little incentive to
increase their productivity voluntarily. Because of the capital-intensive nature of the integrated
steel industry, where the company's assets are geographically set in place, worker unions have
leverage over the management. Workers in the Mon Valley gained by resisting streamlining and
productivity-increasing efforts. In addition, unions had no incentive to encourage productivity of
workers, for increased productivity could potentially cost jobs in the industry.
A high level of antagonism dominated management-worker relations in the Mon Valley
steel industry. Prior to the 1980s, managers in the Monongahela Valley industrial region mostly
embraced Theory X as their management philosophy. This theory assumes that human beings
dislike work, thus try to avoid it. The management response to such behavior should be the
adoption of an authoritarian style of command. Under this philosophy of managing the
workforce, rank and file workers had little say in management decisions, and simply followed
the instructions and orders of their supervisors. This management style was further articulated in
the big plants where management workers did not have to engage in dialogue. As a result,
management had little reason to communicate with workers on the shop floor, thus made
minimal effort to do so (Hoerr, 1988). This resulted in characteristically sour management-labor
relations where management failed to win the trust of employers through words and action.
The 1980s was a tough time for U.S. integrated steelmakers, but the Mon Valley fared
significantly worse in comparison with other steel regions. According to Antonelli (1998,
http://pittsburgh.bcentral.com/pittsburgh/stories/1998/03/16/focus1.html), "Chicago, an area with
even bigger steel ties at the time, made 668,000 tons in 1981 and 513,000 tons in 1983-only a
23 percent decline." On the other hand, between 1981 and 1982, steel output in Pittsburgh fell
by 53%, and 36% of the steel workforce in Mon Valley was laid off (Hoerr, 1988). I
hypothesize that the adversarial labor relations in the region is one of the main culprits for its
rapid economic degeneration.
Getting Worse
The steel industry in the Mon Valley faced a number of challenges in the early 1980s,
which eventually led to changes in its labor and organizational practices. Some of these
challenges were external shocks, such as increased foreign competition, stringent enforcement of
environmental regulations, proliferation of mini-mills, and decreased demand. Yet others were
inherent problems and management mistakes within the integrated mills. These included market
myopia, organizational rigidity, and adverse labor relations. These factors, both independently
and in combination, led to the eventual decline of the Mon Valley steel sector, as it had been
known, in the 1980s.
Foreign Competition
U.S. steel unions were partly responsible initially for steel consumers turning towards
foreign steel. After the steelworkers' 1959 strike, imports of steel to the United States more than
doubled from the previous year. Moreover, the back-log caused by the strike led to an artificially
high demand, followed by a glut in the industry where producers were forced to lay off workers
and deactivate old furnaces. Because foreign suppliers often demanded long-term contracts,
imports surged and then stayed high throughout the 1960s (Hoerr, 1988). According to
Rubinstein (2001, p. 3), "Starting in the 1970s, the large integrated U.S. steel producers were at a
competitive disadvantage in terms of both cost and quality when compared with foreign
competition, particularly from Japan." Foreign imports gained the upper-hand over U.S. steel
production through early adoption of energy-efficient and labor-saving processes (Hathaway,
1993). At the same time, there were also incidences of dumping and government aid to foreign
steel producers, creating an unfair playing field for U.S. steel (Hathaway, 1993). The
combination of rising costs and uncertainty of domestic production and increasingly competitive
foreign industries resulted in growing levels of foreign steel imports to the United States. (Figure
3.1)
Environmental Regulations
U.S. environmental regulations imposed a sizeable cost on the steel industry. The more
polluting processes of steel production are cokemaking and iron-making. These processes emit
polluting gases and harmful particulates into the atmosphere (Polenske and McMichael,
forthcoming). In integrated steel plants that embody the cokemaking and iron-making
components of production, companies have to bear the high costs of complying with
environmental regulations. Environmental legislation challenged the steel industry to develop
cleaner and more efficient production processes than before, yet at the same time competition
from substitute materials forced steelmakers to invest in cost-saving and quality-enhancing
technologies (U.S. EPA, 1995). In the face of this challenge, however, firms often looked to the
most economically beneficial solution instead of those that were labor-friendly. This was done
even though management often used job security and plant operation as an excuse to gain leeway
on regulation compliance (Hathaway, 1993).
Mini-Mills
The mini-mills were a growing threat to the traditional integrated plants for they could
produce steel more cheaply and more cleanly than the integrated mills. Mini-mills are non-
unionized and they use scrap metal in electric-arc furnaces for producing steel (instead of the
traditional blast furnaces that use coke and iron ore as inputs), making their production process
cleaner and more energy-efficient. As the federal air-quality regulations grew stricter, the mini-
mills enjoyed an increasing competitive edge in the steel market (Antonelli, 1998). Furthermore,
the electric-arc furnace technology that allowed for comparatively small-scale production of steel
products moved the production of steel away from traditional steel-producing regions to all parts
of the United States. Steel production no longer had to be concentrated geographically. There
was no longer a need nor advantage to having a steel region.
Market Demand
Since the early 1970s, the demand for steel has dropped, partially due to the energy crisis.
To save on energy costs, auto companies looked for ways to make lighter and more fuel-efficient
cars. Cars became smaller, and plastics and fiber glass substituted for steel in the auto industry
(Hathaway, 1993). The development of other lighter metals and plastics as steel substitutes also
played a role in the dampening demand for steel by other products (Antonelli, 1998). In
addition, the general U.S economy was in recession in the early 1980s. The unemployment rate
reached 10.1% in October of 1982, an all-time high since WWII (Lieber, 1995).
Market Myopia
Hoerr believes that the steel companies relied too much on history and mistakenly
believed that the downturn in the market in the early 1980s was merely cyclical and would
eventually turn up for the better. Companies also failed to modernize to keep abreast of
technological improvements in the industry. This failure spurred employee fears about job
security and eroded management credibility (Hoerr, 1988). Labor relations thus deteriorated.
Organizational Rigidity
Rigidity in the corporate and organizational structures of the steel industry hindered its
long-term competitiveness. Work rules in the "old world" U.S. steel industry were tailored to a
stable market that emphasized the promotion of labor peace. Such a system of organization was
characterized by "narrowly defined jobs, individual incentives, standardized procedures, strong
managerial controls, and extreme specialization" (Rubinstein, 2001, p. 4). Steel-mill jobs were
narrowly defined. Laborers were interested in categorizing jobs as narrowly as possible to (1)
prevent bosses from exercising personal biases in assigning duties to people, and (2) maintain the
level of the workforce (Hoerr, 1988). Unfortunately, this inflexible set-up hindered the
competitiveness of companies in the long run in two ways. First, firms were not responsive to
changes, as they could not easily adjust employment levels (limited factor mobility in
production), nor could they re-shuffle workers and responsibilities to respond to changes in
market conditions. Second, pigeon-holing employees to narrowly defined work posts made them
ill-prepared for industrial restructuring and the eventual de-industrialization of the region. As
workers became highly specialized in a single-industry, single-product environment, they had a
difficult time transitioning into alternative roles in other industries.
Vertical integration, in particular, limited the flexibility of the steel sector in times of
external shocks. U.S. steel mills had historically been vertically integrated, from the sourcing of
fuels and raw materials to final products and channels of distribution. Fully-integrated steel
mills consist of coke ovens, blast furnaces, steel furnaces, and rolling and finishing mills. A
high degree of vertical integration throughout the supply chain means companies cannot react
quickly to changes in the input markets as well as output demand. Being vertically integrated
also limits the companies' ability to make certain choices, for the heavy sunk costs of integrated
plants make assets fixed in place. McKersie believes that this particular attribute allowed unions
to gain the upper-hand in labor negotiations (McKersie, 12/12/2001). Moreover, the integrated
steel mills had been around for a long time, and old production facilities with aging technologies
became increasingly inefficient.
Labor Relations
The fact that industrial workers communities in the Mon Valley were heavily reliant on
one sector is important for understanding the nature of the industrial-labor relations, as well as
the social and economic demise of the region. The Pittsburgh region has a history of resistance
to elite control. According to Hathaway, the workers in the Pittsburgh region have "a history of
militant resistance to the plans the economic elite and their political collaborators made for
them." The steel industry in Pittsburgh is to be remembered as the home of the bloody
Homestead Steel strike of 1892 and the related attempt to assassinate steel magnate Henry Frick
(Hathaway, 1993).
With pressure from the union, the steel industry concentrated on maintaining employment
levels and wages, but paid little attention to investment, technology, organizational
improvement, and global competitiveness. Early decisions to shy away from adoption of
advanced technologies eventually led to the close-down of plants in the 1980s. At the same time,
the management elites in the Mon Valley had in time grown distant from the rank and file
workers in terms of power, resources, and lifestyles. Steel mills generate a lot of noise, smoke,
and air pollution. Whereas mill workers usually lived in dilapidated housing near the mills, the
management elite moved to the suburbs. As a result, land-use and living patterns in the
Monongahela Valley became class-segregated (Ingham, 1991). The physical separation between
the workers and their supervisors created barriers for communication and mutual understanding.
Despite minor successes in exercising moral suasion over the middle classes and some workers,
the management elite in Pittsburgh had for the most part lost contact with the masses of
unskilled, immigrant, and black workers in their mills and in the city at large. (Ingham, 1991)
The Role of Unions
In time, the United Steel Workers of America (USWA) merged with other unions in the
basic metals and industrial sectors. In addition to obtaining wage and benefit increases for
workers, these organizations organize labor and advocate for cost-of-living adjustments,
improved pensions, healthcare, and employment protections. These issues span from health and
safety to civil rights. The range of services provided by the USWA today include banks and
credit unions, food distribution, insurance, travel and entertainment, transportation, social
security, healthcare, childcare, and utilities. The USWA cover regions throughout the United
States and Canada (USWA, 2002). While unionization was supposed to better the welfare of
workers, the Mon Valley experience indicates that the powerful union and its relationship vis a
vis the management played a role in the dreadful demise of the steel sector in the 1980s. The
United Steelworkers had a successful history of organizing strikes to enable workers to stand up
for their rights and fairer work standards prior to the 1980s. This represented a step forward for
the working class. On the flip side, steel companies lost $3- $5 million per day during the
strikes, in addition to $100 million to shut down and restart their plant operation. Companies lost
some of their key managerial employees and drove consumers towards foreign imports (Hoerr,
1988). These costs diminished the competitiveness of the Mon Valley steel sector.
The union's search for a delicate balance between sustaining the workers' voice and
coping with changing economic realities remains a challenge. The union's ability to handle the
challenge, in turn, determines the welfare of workers, the performance of the industry, and the
relationship between labor and management. Hoerr (1988) believed that when organized labor
became incorporated into the economic system after World War II, it lost interest in what was
happening in the work process:
The union presence remained strong on the factory floor in the person of the steward or
grievance committeeman. But he or she fulfilled a narrow quasi-legal function of filling
grievances when members complained about management decisions such as disciplinary
actions or job assignments. The union took virtually no part or responsibility in making
the workplace more productive, or in gaining a direct voice for its members in operations.
... Achieving labor peace and preserving management control were perceived to be the
key labor problems that industrial relations executives were expected to solve. The union
had no concern for competitiveness and rejected the idea that it bore any responsibility
for seeing that the plant operated efficiently. The old saying that "management manages
the business and the union 'grieves"' concisely described the explicit, and artificial,
division of responsibilities (Hoerr, 1998, p. 34).
According to Hoerr, unions got co-opted into being a sated, watchful entity. The result was a
"rigid, legalistic industrial relations system that, in a sense, ignored the outside world. It tended
to alienate workers and could not adjust readily to changes in technology, geopolitics, and
international trade" (Hoerr, 1988, p. 35). Within this framework, there was little development of
trust and open communication between the management and workers.
Uniformity in wages was one of the steel union's original goals. Obtaining common
wages for each of the hundreds of different mill jobs across the entire industry was both a moral
and political strategy to "take wages out of competition." Morally, taking wages out of
competition suggested that workers should not be treated like another raw-material input cost.
Politically, having the same wage rate across the board prevented workers from thinking that the
union was bargaining harder for one group of workers over others (Hoerr, 1988). The rigid
format of negotiation and decision-making hindered the possibility for reform. In the 1970s,
these steelmaking companies could not change under U.S. Steel's leadership, but they were
afraid to "get out from under the umbrella and dance alone under the rain drops." (Hoerr, 1988,
p. 97) Wage uniformity partially accounted for the rigidity that precipitated the decline of the
steel sector in the 1980s.
Unions were also resistant to changes in the organizational structure of the companies.
When the steel companies brought in college graduates as supervisors, the unions viewed it as a
destruction of a partnership. Workers believed that foremen would no longer listen to the
concerns of rank and file workers, so that the gap between management and labor further
widened (Hoerr, 1988). Such resistance made it difficult to attract the best and brightest to the
industry. As a result the industry could not attract personnel of the highest caliber, and it did not
move towards modern technology and management processes as quickly as it could, making it
ill-prepared for market challenges (McKersie, 12/12/2001).
Unionized labor in the steel industry became so powerful in securing their demands and
expanding the benefits and definition of rights and responsibilities that their role eventually
became one that was of substantial legalistic nitpicking. According to Hoerr, by the 1980s the
contracts had become so complicated that each new round of bargaining produced a virtual
library of booklets that were jointly published and distributed to steelworkers by the union and
the companies (Hoerr, 1988).
Apart from economic consequences, the decline of steel in the Mon Valley had sizeable
social consequences. Socially, deindustrialization struck Mon Valley communities by
challenging the fabric of their societies, the institutions of local government, religion, and family
(Hathaway, 1993). Out of desperation, residents from these dire communities turned to crime.
In 1985, some 93% of all serious crimes in Mon Valley were committed by unemployed people,
most of whom were first-time offenders. Suicides and divorce rates also reached all-time highs
during this period (Hathaway, 1993).
Bettering the "Worse"
Threatened by bankruptcy and unemployment, steel management and workers engaged in
creative tactics to help save the industry. Among these efforts were changes in bargaining
strategies, the forming of Labor-Management Participation Teams, and the establishment of new
roles and functions for the unions. In this section, I will briefly describe some of the coping
mechanisms that the industry came up with during the mid-1980s. For the steelmakers, survival
instincts led them to labor issues. Antonelli pointed out that because strikes were both highly
possible and costly to the industry, employers tried hard to avert them. On the other hand,
downsizing and shut-downs signaled to the workers that in order to survive, they might have to
cooperate more with businesses (Antonelli, 1998).
Concession Bargaining
During the hay-days of the steel industry, companies could afford to agree to the
workers' demand without compromising their competitiveness. The slump in the industry that
began in the summer of 1981, however, prompted workers to engage in a process of "concession
bargaining" with their employers. If workers were unwilling to "give" in terms of wage
concessions and give-backs, then employers would threaten to close down the plants to force
wage reduction (Hoerr, 1988). In some cases, steel companies agreed to remit cost-savings to
workers after their plants returned to profitability, before they paid dividends to their
stockholders (Hoerr, 1988).
Faced with concession-bargaining requests, the labor unions developed a policy that
involved three elements: (1) standards for determining whether a company really needed
financial help, and how much; (2) a procedure for membership ratification of the terms of a
concession agreement; and (3) a "system of trade-offs" that the unions would demand in return
for cutting wages and benefits (Hoerr, 1988).
Change in Wage and Compensation Plans
Unions accepted variable pay plans based on company performance as a substitute for
fixed rises in wages. The growing diversity in plant size, products, and technology choices
resulted in different cost structures for the steel companies. Seeing that steel companies faced
increasingly different cost structures and markets, and were engaged in increasingly diverse
businesses, union leaders realized that the USWA could no longer maintain uniform wages and
benefits across companies (Hoerr, 1988). As a supplier of labor, unions would adjust its labor
costs on a company-by-company basis in order to maintain employment and to keep companies
afloat. Furthermore, the unions agreed to freezes on cost-of-living adjustments (Hoerr, 1988).
The buy-in to the Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) represented a fundamental
change in the union's bargaining policy. According to Hoerr, steel workers traditionally rejected
employee ownership because the concept went against the confrontational philosophy of U.S.
trade unionism. The fear was that by owning stock in the company, employees would identify
closely with the management. In fact, the USW believed that the management devised ESOP as
a plan to manipulate workers. Lieber also pointed out that organized labor had come to regard
the stock market as a casino, and would prefer payment of wages and benefits in fixed dollar
amounts rather than in securities (Lieber, 1993). Many companies substituted ESOPs for
pension plans and awarded stocks as workers retired. As steel mills failed in the 1980s as a
result of lack of investment and weakening borrowing power by the companies, the USW felt
that employees themselves had to provide investment capital in order to preserve jobs (Hoerr,
1988).
Change in Attitude
The 1980s marked a change in attitude for the union (McKersie, 12/12/2001). Instead of
banking on the clout that they had historically had over the management, the unions tried to work
through problems of the industry. The leaders of the union were willing to move towards a
constructive relationship with the management. The Labor-Management Participation Teams
were a result of this new attitude.
On the management side, survival instincts led them to labor issues. Antonelli (1998)
pointed out that because strikes were both highly possible and costly to the industry, employers
tried hard to avert them.
Labor-Management Participation Teams (LMPTs)
At a glance, the Labor-Management Participation Teams (LMPTs) closely resemble the
high-performance work systems (Osterman, 2000) that are eminent in the "new world" (post-
1980s) labor markets. LMPTs were negotiated results between the United Steelworkers and the
steel industry and were attempts to improve worker productivity and product quality. They were
based on the idea that workers knew best about the operation of the plant. Union and steel plants
had set up these teams at the departmental level in the plant. Teams, composed of 8-10 hourly
workers and a foreman, met once a week on company time to discuss ways of reducing costs,
eliminating production waste, raising product quality, and improving health and safety
conditions, among other things (Hoerr, 1998). Plants established LMPTs on a voluntary and
experimental basis. At the minimum, these LMPTs created large psychological rewards for the
workers, for they enabled them to speak out, to criticize poor management techniques and to
have a voice in matters that vitally affected them (Hoerr, 1998). The participatory nature of
LMPTs could potentially alter the concept of industrial management.
According to Rubinstein's analysis, the LMPTs produced mixed results. During the
1980s, LMPTs resulted in millions of dollars of savings and solved substantial problems in
safety, quality and productivity in the steel industry. Hundreds of LMPTs were formed and the
United Steelworkers of America even used its national education facility to hold regular LMPT
training sessions. In order to further capture the gains of LMPT, the USWA strengthened the
process by contract in the 1990s (Rubinstein, 2001).
Despite their local success at the few mills where they were implemented, LMPTs did not
fit with the steel companies' management style and philosophy and were therefore not widely
implemented. Middle management, for example, felt threatened by the employee-participation
efforts. "Hourly employee participation conjured up images of blue-collar 'team leaders'
functioning without managers, slashing the middle management class" (Lieber, 1993, p. 243).
Then USWA President Lynn Williams felt that the LMPT process was "more open to
manipulation by management than arrangements more firnly founded in the agreement, open to
being held hostage and dependent on the good will of the players rather than being firmly
grounded in the collective bargaining agreement" (Rubinstein, 2001, p. 9).
Change in Union Nature
In the face of social problems that prevailed throughout the steel mill communities, the
unions had to take on new roles and functions. They changed from being political, advocacy
entities to performing social welfare functions. In the late 1980s, for example, the building that
had previously housed Homestead's local 1397 of the United Steelworkers of America was
converted into a recovery center to support people overcoming drug and alcohol problems
(Hathaway, 1983). When employment in the Mon Valley reached an all-time high since the
Depression in 1982, the unions set up the Mon Valley Unemployment Committee (MVUC) to
provide aid to laid-off workers. Staffed by volunteers, the committee set up food banks and set
up a hotline for contributions to churches and individuals. It provided advice to workers on
collecting employment compensation, on applying for welfare and foodstamps, and also on
retraining classes. In addition, the MVUC lobbied for legislation to help the jobless, and
organized rallies and demonstrations of various kinds (Hoerr, 1988).
Did the Worse Get Better?
In retrospect, did the union's attempts at saving the steel industry work? Or, what were
the implications of the union's shift in tactic and behavior? In the following paragraphs, I discuss
the events in the 1980s in Mon Valley and the mark they left on labor management and
organization, on the Mon Valley regional economy, and on unions. In addition, as the U.S. steel
industry enters another crisis at the beginning of the 21st Century and as the steel industry
globalizes, it is interesting to see what lessons history serves. Lastly, I propose looking at the
current Shanxi Province coke region in the light of the Mon Valley experiences in the 1980s.
The Legacy of Labor-Management Participation Teams
The introduction of the Cooperative Partnership Agreement (CPA) into steel company
negotiations in the 1990s followed the idea of joint labor-management planning, decision-
making and problem-solving that the LMPTs had started. But unlike the LMPTs, the CPA was
included in the contracting language throughout the industry. Because research has shown
benefits to designing participation efforts as a voluntary process, some management leaders
perceived the shift from LMPTs to the mandated CPAs as a move towards inflexibility. At the
same time, the CPAs also expanded the LMPT efforts, which had focused on the shop floor, to a
more strategic-level involvement in decision-making (Rubinstein, 2001).
The Monongahela Valley Regional Economy
The fall of steel in the 1980s also marked the beginning of the de-industrialization
process that prevailed throughout other industrial regions in the United States. Employment in
the industrial sector never recovered after the drop in the 1980s. A national survey showed that
less than half of the 219,000 Mon Valley primary metal workers who lost their jobs between
1979 and 1983 found work by January of 1984. 18% of those who did find work were only
employed part-time (Hathaway, 1993).
The Mon Valley's past as a steel capital qualitatively influenced its growth as a region.
Today, steel is only the 10th largest employer in Pennsylvania (U.S. Department of Labor,
2001). The decreasing significance of steel employment left the Mon Valley region with a two-
tiered labor market: one in the high-technology sector, and the other in the services sector.
Although steel mills are no longer the leading employer in the region, some jobs in the Mon
Valley are off-springs of the region's bustling industrial past. These high-technology sectors
include engineering, research institutions, robotics, and computer science. These components of
the economy developed only after the downturn in the steel industry. The employment in the
high-technology sector increased by 25% between 1982 and 1985. By the mid-1980s, high-tech
sectors employed more people than steel (Hathaway, 1993). The increase in high-tech, high-skill
employment, however, did not benefit the steel workers who lost their jobs.
The shift in the economic base in the Mon Valley from industrial manufacturing to high-
technology and service industries widened income inequality. Between 1980 and 1986,
industrial employment in the Pittsburgh region decreased by 44%, while employment in its
service sector rose by more than 25%. However, according to the Mellon Economic Update,
these service jobs tended to be lower-skilled and lower-paid, not fully replacing the high-wage
manufacturing jobs (Hathaway, 1993).
Finally, the de-industrialization of the Mon Valley represented a window of employment
opportunity for women. Because of the nature of work in coal-based industries, employees had
always been all men. When men brought home the income, women were often confined to the
roles of being wives and daughters of mine workers or steelworkers. The closing of mines and
steel-plants and the growth of the service-sector economy expanded female participation in the
labor force. As women's work and wages increased, they contributed more to the households'
incomes, thus potentially raising their status and power within the households (Dublin, 1998).
The Role, Function, and Philosophy of Unions
In general, the 1980s "proved to be a decade marked by decline and retrenchment for
labor unions in the United States" (Laslett, 1996). The steel crisis in the 1980s uncovered some
of the inefficiencies and rigidities introduced by labor unions and their antagonistic tendencies.
Faced with high unemployment and waning morale among workers and communities, unions
lost bargaining power. Yet, the time of difficulty was also a window of opportunity for unions to
demonstrate the strength of the participative process, and to revolutionize the system of labor
management and labor relations. Steel unions in the 1980s changed the industry, as well as
themselves, when faced with devastating external shocks.
From their experience in the 1980s, labor saw that their wages and benefits had to be tied
in to the rest of the system, namely with the steel industry, steel consumers, and overall regional
employment. The idea of concession bargaining suggested that unions were willing to take a
step back in order that the industry could move forward. Unions took back their demands on
mandatory cost-of-living adjustments, and uniform wages, for which they had traditionally
steadfastly stood.
The nature and function of the union changed during this period, from a merely political,
workers' advocacy entity to serving social needs. The MVUC was an example of these efforts.
Although the function and nature of the union have changed a bit, the committee was "inciting
activism on the part of rank and filers who had never taken part in union activities" (Hoerr, 1988,
p. 620).
The unions in the steel industry had been successful in harnessing bargaining power and
securing jobs and benefits for their workers prior to the 1980s. Even during times of high
unemployment and economic difficulties, the union was effective in lobbying in Congress for
economic stimulation, retraining, and trade barriers (Hoerr, 1988). What the union had not
foreseen, however, was the need to deal with the more social aspects associated with workers'
life, such as psychological problems and stress associated with job loss, and the need to develop
new jobs, new markets, and new skills.
The experience in the 1980s strengthened the participatory process. Despite union's
resistance to taking stock in company ownership, unions and management have increasingly
cooperated to perform functions that had previously been in the exclusive domain of the
management. After the 1980s, unions and companies are seen to decide jointly on plant design
and location, job redesign, training, and retraining (Hoerr, 1988). Workers, in fact, have gained a
voice in not only determining their wages, but also their occupational environment, work
processes, and skills training. Hathaway (1993) saw the experience as a reminder of how
ordinary citizens can affect the "rules of the game", and the dangers of excluding working people
from society's decision-making process. "The creative response of groups of workers to the
destruction of the Mon Valley can offer workers in other times and other places both inspiration
and a chance to learn from mistakes" (Hathaway, 1993, p. 222).
In retrospect, who won the battle after the steel crisis of the 1980s? If unions were indeed
instrumental in saving the steel industry and steel mill communities, then membership should
rise. If labor relations did, in fact, improve, then we should continue to observe a resilient and
robust steel industry today. From the union's side, union membership in Allegheny dropped
from 30% of the work force to 21% in the 1970s, to less than 17% in the 1980s (Hoerr, 1988).
By the end of 2001, of the United Steelworkers of America's 650,000 workers, only 25% were
steelworkers, and the rest were employed in the health-care, rubber, chemicals and other
industries (Matthews, 2001). The market share of integrated steel mills continued to decline
after the 1980. In 2000, electric-arc furnaces used in mini-mills accounted for 48% of North
American steel production (Berry, 2000).
The year 2001 once again saw the U.S. steel industry amidst tough times. Concurrent
with a dwindling world economy, the global demand for U.S. steel shrank, pushing U.S. steel
prices to an all-time low since the 1980s. A Wall Street Journal article calls it the worst time in
the United Steelworkers of America's 59-year history (Matthews, 2001). In the face of cheap
foreign imports, U.S. steel companies experience problems of overcapacity. U.S. companies are
again at the verge of bankruptcy, and talks of consolidation and mergers persist. Labor issues
once again came to the forefront. This time, workers retirement is a key issue. For example,
would the government or the companies bear the burden of millions of dollars in health care
costs for retired workers? (Kapner, 2001) Unions and industry lobby for import tariffs in order
to save U.S. jobs and production. According to one calculation, however, levying a 20% tariff
on steel imports would eventually cost U.S. consumers in terms of higher prices for steel
products. These amount to Americans paying $326,000 for each steel worker retained, making
trade protectionism a very expensive way of preserving employment (Kahn, 2001). Tying back
to the central theme of this study, I believe it is both interesting and necessary to examine the
different trade-offs between employment, labor relations, and the welfare of a regional economy.
Conclusion
I have described some of the reasons for the downturn in the Monongahela Valley steel
industry in the 1980s, and the industry's response. Some of the changes during this period did
alter things in the industry for the better and represented a step forward for industrial labor
relations. In this case study I have focused on the relation between hostile labor-management
relations and the economic demise of the Mon Valley region in the 1980s.
It is unlikely that business would have gone on as usual had labor relations been more
amicable and workers were cooperative and flexible. Other factors, such as electric-arc furnace
technology, the global energy crisis, the increase in foreign steel production, etc., all affected the
U.S. integrated steel industry negatively. Rather than suggesting a possible alternative to the way
events played out in the Mon Valley in the 1980s, I attempt to tell the story from the labor
perspective to show how it is an area that deserves legitimate concern. Although labor does not
constitute the only explanation, or solution, for the deindustrialization and social deterioration of
the Mon Valley story, I have shown that it did play a part. Social relations matter in the well
running of a regional economy.
Regional economic experiences also in turn affect the dynamics of labor relations and
practices. Evidence suggests that the as a collective voice for workers, U.S. steel unions have lost
some of their original purposes and vigor after the experience. In conclusion, there are many
reasons why the Mon Valley experienced such a dramatic economic and social demise. Being
able to identify some of these reasons and to see why they came into being, and how they could
be handled, should provide important insights for the industries' and regions' smooth sailing in
the future.
Why So Bad?
The 1980s witnessed a decline in the U.S. steel sector, and in this chapter I focused on the
Mon Valley experience. There are various reasons for the rapid demise of the regional economy.
Some of the reasons were external, such as the overall recession in the U.S. economy, and
increased competition. Yet other reasons were inherent in the running and organization of the
steel industry. In this chapter, I have emphasized on the role of unions during this period of
economic difficulty, and looked at how the 1980s marked a turning point in the nature and
functioning of both the unions and the labor market in the Monongahela Valley steel sector.
The difficulty in the steel industry in the 1980s, to a large extent, could be attributed to the
downturn in the overall U.S. economy. With the recession, rising unemployment, and a climate
of deregulation, the steel industry was by no means the only ill-fated one. The intriguing thing
about the Mon Valley during this period, however, was that its steel sector declined at a much
more rapid rate than its counterparts in other parts of the United States. The national economy
and policy environment could not explain the entire story. Bad management was also largely
responsible for the rapid deterioration of the industry. As described earlier, organizational
rigidity, myopic decision-making, and untactful management of the labor force rendered U.S.
steel companies uncompetitive in the face of external shocks.
Did the rise of the steel sector in the Monongahela Valley represent an undesirable model
for regional growth and planning? The Mon Valley mill towns proliferated along with the
industrial boom in the late 1890s. Hoerr's sentiment was that more attention was being paid to
the machines than to the people who operated them. The idea of growth and progress dominated
and over-rode everything (Hoerr, 1988). Trying to protect their labor supply, steel companies
actively discouraged other industries from entering the region, making the Mon Valley a single-
industry region. Steel communities essentially became part of the steel corporations. Hoerr
noted that in the 1960s, the Mon Valley was characterized by decentralization, subdivision, and
separation that made regional development programs hard to implement (Hoerr, 1988). Class-
segregated land use and living patterns in the Monongahela Valley created barriers for
communication and mutual understanding between workers and the management. Company
towns can also elicit social problems. Lieber (1995) believes that in a company-dominated town,
residents often sense a lack of control over their lives, which can breed fatalism. Hoerr's account
concurred with Lieber's. He sensed that the authoritarian and rigid leadership in the steel sector
induced fear, repression, discrimination and parochialism, and produced social instability in the
Mon Valley. Workers were trapped in a social environment that cast them into accustomed
routines and union-management relations that they dared not upset (Hoerr, 1988).
Ultimately, bad relations played an important part in the Mon Valley's rapid decline.
Why were relations so bad? Besides the fundamental value clashes between labor and
management and the general confrontational attitude that persisted in American industries, Hoerr
suggested that relations in the Mon Valley had a bad start:
The Mon Valley mill towns did not spring full grown from the iron breast of Andrew
Carnegie. Most of them had a rural antecedent, though it might not have been more than
a country crossroads with a few houses. Upon this pre-revolutionary civilization, with its
century-old political divisions and rural characteristics, was imposed a harsh factory
economy. Out of the inevitable clash grew a new way of life with social and political
patterns that would have a profound effect on relations between workmen and bosses in
the steel mills (Hoerr, 1988, p. 162).
From the very beginning, then, there was hostility between the capitalists and the proletariat,
whereby the workers felt exploited and their lives disrupted. The main problem with bad
relations and hatred is that they can lead to irrational behavior. Although management and labor
could have cooperated to solve their problems, often they fought for the sake of fighting. Hoerr
said that when plants were at the edge of being closed down and workers knew that they were
not going back to work, they still wanted to vote against concession at meetings just so they
could hurt the companies (Hoerr, 1988). As things changed for the worse in the Mon Valley in
the early 1980s, workers saw injustice in their situation. Steelworkers resented the fact that
while they and their forefathers had built the steel industry and made fortunes for the corporate
management, that same management elite had cast them abruptly aside when troubles hit, and
moved on to make profits elsewhere (Hathaway, 1993). The chasm between labor and
management thus deepened at a time when cooperation and solidarity were needed.
Lessons Learned
What can we learn from the Mon Valley experience? Can labor and management get
along? Has the nature of labor relations in the steel industry, in fact, changed for the better? A
number of factors influence the nature and dynamics of labor-management relations. The ways
these factors are handled will affect labor relations, hence industrial robustness, in the future.
First and foremost, leadership is important. From the Mon Valley experience, the
willingness of leaders from both the union and the management sides to begin working and
negotiating with one another was an important milestone in setting the tone for cooperation.
From the labor side, the beginning of concession bargaining could be viewed as a step-back, for
labor was seen as handing over power to the management. However, because the United Auto
Workers (UAW) had granted wage relief to Ford earlier, leaders within the steel unions saw
concession bargaining as an acceptable tactic where labor could take a step back without losing
its purpose. United Steelworkers' morale and membership actually declined when McBride
(USWA chairman) was sick and took a leave of absence (Hoerr, 1988). In the current steel
crisis, we may see a different labor-management dynamic as a function of leadership. Leo
Gerard, the current president of the United Steelworkers, is resistant to pleas for extreme
financial give-backs from the unions to the steelmakers. He maintains that the union is not to
blame for the steel industry's precarious state. He believes that the workers have done
everything right and cannot be blamed for the integrated steel mills' problem (Mathews, 2001).
Second, the notion of power is tricky. Most people, at least in the West, seek power; yet
power can potentially lead to exploitation, complacency, and inflexibility. Unions seek to
empower workers against powerful, exploitative employers. In the case of the steel industry in
the late 1970s, the unions were so powerful that their might hindered organizational flexibility
and almost destroyed the competitiveness of the industry. Once power is seized, it is often
difficult to let go. As demonstrated earlier, the failure of some of the cooperative efforts, e.g.,
the Labor-Management Participation Teams, was attributed to the management's unwillingness
to share decision-making power with rank-and-file workers.
The national and regional political climates also play a role in fostering a cooperative
atmosphere. During the Carter Administration, the secretaries of labor and commerce co-chaired
the Steel Tripartite Committee (STC). Based on the concept of gaining consensus among
management, labor, and government, the STC was a promising solution to the industry's
problems (Hoerr, 1988). Under a political climate that favored minimal government intervention
in industries, however, the committee was disbanded during the Reagan administration.
Although there are channels through which government, industry, and labor can cooperate and
contribute positively to the economic process, political ideology can make or break the
implementation. In the current steel crisis, the U.S. government may actually erect trade barriers
and bail out the domestic steel industry as a strategic move of minimizing reliance on foreign
steel imports. According to the Wall Street Journal, it also makes political sense as a substantial
number of steel-mill retirees and current employees live in key election states. Their job security
and pensions will directly determine their votes (Mathews, 2001).
Trust and goodwill between labor and management are double-edged swords. In the
United States, unions have an incentive to isolate themselves from the management and even to
cultivate certain adversarial relations in order to build solidarity among the workers. At the same
time, the constant distrust and ill-will between workers and management decreased
organizational flexibility and rendered the industry vulnerable to external shocks. From the
union's side, they perceived the management as having ulterior motives. From the companies'
perspective, they saw workers as merely brainless attachments to machines, always wanting
more benefits for themselves. Plant managers did not think that unions were there to help.
Rather they perceived unions as being there to stymie progress (Hoerr, 1988). In essence, the
organized labor movement in the 1980s operated in a society that both disliked unions and
agreed to their rights and purposes of existence (Hoerr, 1988).
Social capital plays a vital role in labor relations. In the Monongahela Valley's case, it
affected labor's ability to organize. With the Monongahela Valley being a steel region, workers
share the dual identities of being both residents of a community and colleagues in the workplace.
Social capital and solidarity are therefore abundant among the people in the region and allow
unions to target issues that touch and affect all. This makes organization relatively easy. With
new technology comes decentralization of production, as in the case of the mini-mills. People
separate their communities in which they live from their work place-a disconnect exists
between the "working life" and the "community life"; therefore the fervor for solidarity and
gaining a collective voice subsides.
In order for management-labor relations in the steel industry, and perhaps in the United
States in general, to progress, a shift in mind-set about the nature of negotiations has to occur.
Labor and management in the Monongahela steel industry had historically engaged in zero-sum
bargaining where one side's gain always suggested the other's loss. Within this bargaining
framework, the unions saw companies' profits and profitability as fixed, and their goal was to
maximize their share of benefits by imposing high demands on the management (wanting a large
piece of the pie). What the unions and management failed to recognize, until too late, was that
they could work together to increase the profitability that the companies are capable of achieving
(enlarging the entire pie for everybody). Yet, the mutual gains approach to labor negotiations is
only applicable if labor and management operate in the same value system. Historically, the
struggles between labor and management have represented a clash in values. The employers
have often thought of workers as an input in the production process, whereas unions were
essentially trying to fight against the idea. They believed in the voice, and the rights, and the
power for self-determination on the part of the workers. Until this clash in values can be
reconciled, there is little room for resolution for the more tangible economic issues. How can
values be reconciled, and do we necessarily want to compromise the ideological underpinning of
unionism so that business can run as usual?
CHAPTER 4
CHINESE TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISES
I propose that the institutions and environments in which Chinese Township and Village
Enterprises (TVEs) operate provide opportunities for positive labor relations. Favorable
relations among industrial workers and management, in turn, favor regional competitiveness.
But from where do good relations arise? Among factors like technology constraints, legal
institutions, industry structure, and market conditions is the presence and importance of social
capital. In this chapter, I outline the historical background and current institutional environments
of the TVEs, and I show the unique backdrop that provides the TVEs a favorable window of
opportunity for positive labor relations. Specifically, these are the communal nature of the
enterprises and the deep-seeded culture of social networks (guanxi) in rural China. In
explaining the functioning of TVEs, I introduce the influence of social structures into decisions
that can be deemed purely "economic." I conclude with hypotheses on how the TVEs are going
to affect industrial relations in today's rural Chinese industrial sector.
What are TVEs?
The Township and Village Enterprises (TVE) is a twenty-year-old economic institution
in rural China. The TVEs are products of the Chinese economic reforms in the late 1970s that
have contributed significantly to China's recent economic performance. By their official
definition, TVEs are collectively-owned businesses that are in townships or villages. This means
all residents in the township or village that establishes the TVE share ownership of it (Weitzman
and Xu, 1994, p. 128). In this section, I describe the historical, political, and economic
backdrops against which this entity came about, and the evolution of the nature of these
enterprises in recent years.
Historical Background
The growth of TVEs in the countryside was enabled, first and foremost, by the increased
productivity in the Chinese agricultural sector. Cao et al. (1998) attributed the growth of the
Chinese economy solely to the declining share of agriculture workers in the economy.
Agricultural reforms in the countryside resulted in savings. The TVE thus arose as a vehicle to
channel savings into the industrial sectors in the rural areas.
Enterprise reform in China encouraged the development of these non-state, small- scale
township and village enterprise firms. These economic entities had their origin in Mao's
programs of rural industrialization. As early as 1958, Mao talked of people's communes running
rural industries (Unger and Cui, 1994). After 1984, they were encouraged by local governments.
TVEs' share of gross industrial output rose from 10% in 1980 to 45% in 1993; also in the latter
year, together with urban industrial "collectives" and fully private firms, they accounted for a
majority (57%) of industrial production (Cable, 1996). On the other hand, between 1978 and
1993, the SOE share of national industrial output dropped from 78% to 43% (Jin and Qian,
1998). National policy makers in China view the development of TVEs and the private sector in
the interior of China as one way to narrow the income gap between interior and coastal regions
(IFC, 2000). In the mid-1990s, TVEs employed half of China's surplus rural laborers (130
million). In 1998, TVE output accounted for 28% of China's gross domestic product (GDP)
(ChinaOnline, 2000).
Nature and Ownership Structure of TVEs
Township and Village Enterprises vary in nature, size, and scope. The official definition
of a TVE has been constantly changing since the inception of this economic entity in the late
1970s. According to the IFC 2000 report, private (and semi-private) businesses in the
countryside first emerged in the trade and services sector (where large state-owned enterprises
had limited involvement) for historical and ideological reasons, but eventually expanded into
other industries (IFC, 2000).
The rural commune was the predecessor of the TVE. Up until 1984, TVEs were
community-owned. Local governments controlled the operation of the TVEs, and these
enterprises paid (and still pay) lower taxes than a private enterprise. After further economic
reforms in 1984, the terms of approval and supervision of TVEs varied greatly across regions
(Cao et al., 1998).
The ownership definition of TVEs has varied over time. Currently, there are three broad
categories of TVEs. The first kind is completely privately owned, but they often register as
being collectively owned to avoid legal discrimination; the second kind receives approval from
local authorities in return for a commitment to make an annual contribution to the village funds;
the third kind is tightly controlled by local authorities.
The definitions and assignments of property rights among TVEs are equally varied.
According to Cable (1996), leaders of TVEs in the early 1980s were the entrepreneurs; by the
late 1980s, these leaders were able to hire professional managers to supervise and run the day-to-
day operations of the facilities. Some of the managers were not assigned property rights to the
firm, and they did not share in the economic performance of the firm. In contrast, there were
examples of managers who have become much more autonomous, being assigned increasingly
more of the firm's property rights. Three types of contracting arrangements current exist within
TVEs:
" Fixed-wage contract-leaders manage the firm, everyone gets paid a salary
e Profit-sharing contract-local leaders and managers form business partnerships
" Fixed-payment contract-managers pay a lump sum to the local government in return
for more comprehensive use rights over the firm's business operations. Managers
also must perform virtually all external and internal management duties.
Due to the vagueness surrounding the changing nature in ownership and control of the TVEs,
official statistics on TVEs now cover all non-state enterprises in the rural sector (Cao et al.,
1998). Table 4.1 provides an overview of how official statistics have treated the definition of
TVEs from the years 1996 to 1998, as well as the working definitions of TVEs for the Shanxi
Cokemaking sector case study (Chapter 5).
Table 4.1: TVE DEFINITIONS
China TVE China TVE China TVE AGS TVE
Statistical Statistical Statistical Survey
Yearbook 1996 Yearbook 1997 Yearbook 1998 2000
Township owned 4
Village owned
Collectively/ Joint
owned
Privately owned
Self! Individually
owned
Rent Lease owned
Shareholding
Source: China Township and Village Enterprises Statistical Yearbooks, 1996, 1997, 1998 and
AGS China Cokemaking Project TVE Survey 2000.
The blurry definitions of TVEs reflect the ambiguity surrounding their property and control
rights. These ambiguities not only show up in classifications and definitions of these enterprises,
but also in their operation (e.g., decisions over daily operations, decision over the disposition of
profits, and the rule of tax collection) (Li, 1996).
In reality, many registered "collectively-owned" firms are, in fact, privately owned. The
collective ownership status enables firms "to evade the prohibition of private firms and
ideological harassment by the government" (IFC, 2000, p. 20). Having registered as a TVE also
brings in government involvement in the firm, which can be helpful in securing access to land,
assets, finance, and markets. In the context of imperfect markets, the ambiguities over property
rights allows TVEs the buffer of government intervention. Through sharing rights to the
enterprise, the local government can help to facilitate transactions when market mechanisms fail
(Li, 1996). Local governments also often subsidize collectives and TVEs, through tax breaks,
favorable contracts, or loans on preferential terms (IFC, 2000).
The IFC 2000 report indicates that the private sector in China demonstrates a high degree
of informality. Many of these enterprises "possess only the vaguest of property rights,
ownership structures, corporate governance mechanisms, financial records, and rights to market
access. They are often part of complex groups of companies, spanning many different activities"
(IFC, 2000, p. vii). In the rural areas, large private enterprises were able to register as collective
enterprises. Also, firms could obtain a "collective license" by paying a state or collective unit, or
a local government organization (IFC, 2000). A benefit of these particularly ambiguous
institutional arrangements is that entrepreneurs and enterprises enjoy the flexibility to respond to
changing government policies, taxes, and regulations (IFC, 2000).
The economic performance of Chinese TVEs and private enterprises questions the
necessity of well-defined property rights in a functional capitalist economy. The fact that
communities and local governments share property ownership and corporate governance
responsibilities with the TVE entrepreneurs gives these enterprises an informal, ambiguous
character. This character, in turn, makes TVEs efficient and competitive given the imperfect
market institutions in a transitional economy (Li, 1995). Analysts (Weitzman and Xu, 1994, Li,
1996) point out, however, that the ambiguity of property rights and hybrid forms of ownership
result in perverse incentives, hence may become a drain on resources. Managers and
entrepreneurs have to concentrate on rent-seeking rather than economic returns, forcing collusion
between local governments and firms (IFC, 2000). I was unable to determine to what extent the
managers' preoccupation with rent-seeking impacts their management mentalities and their
relationship with rank-and-file workers.
The Emergence of Rural Chinese Labor Markets
As a socialist county where government ownership has been the norm, the idea of a labor
market had been alien to the Chinese economy prior to the economic reforms in the late 1970s.
Labor planning had long been part of China's overall state plan, and central and local
government labor offices controlled employment and job assignments (Bian, 1994). For a long
time, there was no flow of labor between urban and rural China, hence no flow of labor between
industrial (urban) and agricultural (rural) sectors. It was not until the introduction of the
production responsibility system (PRS) in agriculture and price reforms that the industrial and
agricultural sectors co-existed in China's countryside (Xin, 1990). As economic activities in the
countryside had traditionally been confined to the agricultural sector, the absence of a concept of
labor markets is even more pronounced.
The Idea of Chinese Labor Markets
According to Chan (2000), economic reforms in China introduced a labor market that had
not existed previously.
Due to the socialist nature of the State-owned firms, internal labor markets did not
exist. Before 1978 in China, jobs were guaranteed through government
assignments, and employers were not allowed to lay off workers. Wages and
benefits were centrally regulated, salary increases were determined by state
budgets, and career promotions followed ranking systems imposed by central
planners. It was only during the economic reforms of the 1980s that internal labor
markets were being used for the distribution of material incentives and
promotions (Bian, 1994, p. 5)
A contract system replaced the old lifetime employment system, and the previous eight-grade
wage system was abolished. The decentralization of control and ownership increased conflicts
between workers and the management (Chan, 2000).
The State-Owned Enterprise
SOEs have historically provided Chinese workers (predominantly urban) with life-time
employment. The Work Unit (danwei) provides workers and their families with comprehensive
social services ranging from housing to education to healthcare. The danwei went beyond being
an economic and industrial structure and became a political and psychological structure in which
workers' and managers' identities were embedded (Warner, 2000). The prevalence of the
danwei system insulated Chinese workers from a labor market. According to Warner (2000), it
"evoked a mindset linked to a command economy, apparently immune from market pressures
and fully buttressed by a set of supportive Party-led bodies" (Warner, 2000, p. 4).
SOEs have not been the most economically efficient. These "socialist" firms operate
under bureaucratic, rather than market, coordination. The government controls and allocates
resources for production, assigns quotas on outputs, and sets prices. Government subsidies are
guaranteed to maintain profitability of all enterprises (Bian, 1994). Compared to the Township
and Village Enterprises, SOEs, in general, have higher labor costs. Based on cross-sectional
analysis of China's 27 major industrial sectors, Mahdavi (2001) found that agricultural Non-
TVEs (i.e., SOEs) have direct and indirect labor inputs (measured by the number of workers)
almost 3 times as great as the TVE agricultural sector. TVEs also have less wage expenses. In
1995, the national average wage for TVE employees was 4,512 Renminbi (RMB) per year,
compared to 6,747 RMB in SOEs. Furthermore, TVE employers have lower social-welfare costs
of labor. In 1999, SOEs on average paid 490 RMB per worker per year in social welfare costs,
compared to 149 RMB/worker/year among TVEs. (Mahdavi, 2001) At the same time, SOEs are
more heavily invested in assets than are TVEs. (Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2001) This and
the relative labor-cost savings by TVEs make SOEs less capital-efficient than their TVE
counterparts. According to Mahdavi's (2001) analysis of 1996 data, Non-TVEs/ SOEs have
value-added per employee that is twice as great as that among TVEs, but capital expenditures per
employee is almost three times as much in SOEs. Table 4.2 outlines some of the differences in
labor insurance and non-wage benefits among various ownership structures. Although these data
were based on urban firms in Tianjin, the table offers a relatively good snapshot of the
comparisons in labor practices between China's state and non-state enterprises.
Cao et al. (1998) argue that workers employed in SOEs would not choose to shift to non-
state enterprises, because the SOEs offer more generous packages of wages and social
protection. The TVEs tap into rather different labor pools than those of the SOEs. TVE
employees are often first-generation industrial workers who have traditionally worked in
agriculture. Farmers had never enjoyed the levels of benefits and social protection of those
employed in SOEs. Therefore, they have been willing to shift out of low-income agricultural
activities to the relatively higher-paying jobs in the TVEs (Cao, 1998).
Table 4.2: LABOR INSURANCE AND BENEFITS FOR WORKERS IN CHINESE NON-STATE SECTORS, 1994:
Item Collectives by Collectives by Urban Collectives by Sub- Collectives by Village,
Municipal Bureau District or Rural district Government Township Cooperative,
County Government and Private
Sectors
Health insurance
- employees 
-Same as state 
-Same as state 
-up to 75% -50%- 70% 
-none
- dependents -Up to 50% -Up to 50% 
-limited 
-limited 
-none
Pension as % of salary 60%- 90% 60%- 90% 60% fixed Vary, up to 60% none
Injury, Disability, and death benefits
- injury
- disability 
-Same as state 
-Same as state 
-1-time limited payment -1-time limited 
-ask from
- death 
-Same as state 
-Same as state 
-limited for funeral payment government
-limited for funeral -limited for funeral 
-limited for funeral -none
Benefits for women workers
- 3-month maternity leave -same as state 
-same as state 
-same as state -50% of salary -none
- longer maternity leave -same as state 
-none 
-none 
-none 
-none
- infant nursery allowance -limited amount 
-none 
-none 
-none 
-none
- day-care allowance 
-limited amount 
-none 
-none 
-none 
-none
Holiday, sick leave and leave of absence
benefits
- holiday 
-same as state 
-same as state 
-same as state 
-same as state -none
- sick leave 
-same as state 
-same as state -50% pay 
-limited pay 
-none
- leave of absence 
-same as state 
-same as state 
-no pay 
-no pay 
-none
Other benefits Limited Limited None None None
Source: (1) Kegulations ot Wage and Benefits for Tianjin Financial and Trade Industries." (2) "Jinghai County Grain Bureau
Documents on Wages and Benefits." (3) Bian's interviews with officials of given collective organizations. Taken from Table 8.1
Bian, 1994 (pp. 184- 185).
The Township and Village Enterprise Labor Market
Workers play a critical role in fostering the competitiveness of township and village
enterprises. According to Byrd and Lin (1990), "lower overall labor costs and apparently
superior labor motivation and effort have been principal sources of TVPs' [Township, Village,
and Private Enterprises] competitive advantage in relation to state enterprises. Wages of TVP
employees are much more closely tied to individual and enterprise performance than are those of
most state workers." (Byrd and Lin, 1990, p. 275) In addition to the lower wages and benefits at
TVEs compared to SOEs, workers in TVEs tend to work harder, for longer hours, and in more
difficult conditions (Byrd and Lin, 1990). This is possibly due to workers seeing a close tie
between their efforts, the enterprises' business performance, and their incomes. This type of
work ethics and job performance is similar to the Z-firm model observed in Japanese companies,
where the notion life-time employment and company-provided social services allowed firms to
pay lower wages compared to their Western counterparts. I argue that because TVE workers
enjoy job security through community membership, they are likely to accept short-term long
wages and reduced benefits in exchange for the long-term prosperity of the enterprise.
Gelb (1990) considers Township, Village and Private enterprises (TVPs) an "in-between"
sector due to their part public, part communal, and part private nature. Furthermore TVEs
operate both in free markets and planned ones for inputs and outputs. These "in-between"
characteristics of TVPs/ TVEs have labor-market implications. Gelb hypothesizes the following
models of ownership and management for enterprises:
e The public-enterprise model: labor is allocated to firms rather than hired in the market,
and workers have great job security;
e The communal model: firms are owned and controlled by a community, and employees
are members of the community. Job security is safeguarded by through community
membership. Workers are hired through voluntary applications and informal community
ties;
e The Taylorist model: labor is a variable factor of production, work patterns are
simplified, and workers are replaceable;
* The Japanese Z-firm model: workers identify strongly with their firms, resulting in low
turnover rates, close ties between the firms' profitability and payments to labor. Labor
mobility is low, and family members and partners often make up a substantial proportion
of the work force. (Gelb, 1990)
Using data from a Worker Survey Questionnaire, Gelb found that TVPs are closer to the
communal or Z-firm model than to the other models. In addition, he also noticed that workers
were relatively content, despite a lack of say in the running of their firms. He attributes workers'
satisfaction to the newness of the TVPs and the fact that these were first-generation industrial
workers. He questions how attitudes and labor relations would evolve as the TVP sector matures
(Gelb, 1990).
Given the differences in what SOEs and TVEs have to offer their workers (in terms of job
security and social benefits), an analyst may logically hypothesize that private firms would have
difficulty in hiring and keeping skilled workers, provided that labor is mobile. The IFC 2000
survey of four urban industrial regions found that in Beijing and Chengdu, university graduates
prefer foreign companies, joint ventures, and government institutions over Chinese private firms,
despite the private firms paying higher wages than the SOEs (IFC, 2000).
The Emergence of Labor Issues
In a Maoist planned economy, worker power is limited and the concept of private rights
is absent. Labor is considered a national resource, not just another commodity (Bian, 1994) In
order to foster stability, central planning prohibits job turnover between workplaces (Davis,
1990). Worker unions within SOEs have been subject to the Communist party, and they are
designed for the government and management to control, rather than serve, workers (Walker,
1986). Chinese economic textbooks define labor as a common asset of the nation, and not an
individual's private property. Hence, labor is a national resource, and not something that is
arbitraged and traded in a market. (Tang 1990)
Currently, the organization of labor in China is weak. The so-called unions in China
resemble bureaucracies more so than advocates for labor rights and welfare. The All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), whose membership is intended to be universal, remains
the only voice of workers. The Chinese Communist Party is careful to ensure that the trade/labor
union comes under tighter surveillance than other bureaucracies (Chan, 2000). "Under the
government's prodding, and itself in search of a role, the union has taken on new roles as a
welfare relief agency and as an employment agency. But within the trade union, some wonder
whether the union should get involved in relief work or whether it should instead concentrate on
protecting workers' rights." (Chan, 2000, p. 52) The Enterprise Law of 1988 ensures built-in
mechanisms of checks and balances between management and workers in state and collective
enterprises. Workers' interests are represented by a democratically elected Staff and Workers'
Representative Congress (SWRC). In practice, however, the managers' power in these SWRCs
far outweighs the workers' (Chan, 2000). Despite the unions' struggles to increase its power and
usefulness, its presence is predominantly in the urban regions. According to my literature
search, organized labor is absent from the rural landscape.
Traditionally, labor issues have not raised much attention in the countryside. With
farmers participating in a predominantly commune system, there was little room for conflicts that
are characteristic of employer-employee relationships. For those participating in non-farm
activities, SOEs and their largely subsidized work units (danwei) created life-time employment
and comprehensive benefits to workers and their families (e.g., housing, education, healthcare,
and pension). Due to the paternal and provisional nature of the state-employer, labor treatment
and relations were not contested subjects-at least not openly. Recent trends indicate that TVEs
are increasingly diverging from the small-scale cooperative model towards professional
management and public ownership. This proliferation of private and/or semi-private TVEs with
generally scarce labor provisions means different sets of labor issues may surface. Within the
SOEs, the joint stockholding arrangement leads Chan (2000) to believe that workers'
relationships with the management would change. The nature of the change, however, is yet to
be seen (Chan, 2000).
According to Cable (1996), the poor conditions and insecurity associated with work in
the TVEs could become more widespread. In reality, the position is much more complex.
Despite authoritarian government, there are many reports from China of labor unrest as workers
organize, sometimes violently, to resist low pay and deteriorating conditions, particularly poor
safety. This evidence suggests that a vast labor supply does not necessarily translate into a low-
wage, cooperative, and productive workforce. There are certainly costs in training,
accommodating, and motivating unskilled workers with rural background to become productive
employees (Cable, 1996). These factors must be considered when planning and evaluating the
future of China's labor-intensive manufacturing sectors.
Characteristics of the Rural Chinese Labor Market and Social Capital
In China, the rural industrial labor market is different from the urban industrial labor
market in various ways. For example, due to the short history of industrial presence in the
Chinese countryside, many of the employees at TVEs are first-generation industrial workers.
Having endured the tough agrarian livelihood, first-generation industrial workers are thus
tolerant of the often more difficult working conditions of industrial TVEs. Economic reforms
have to a certain extent deepened the divide between urban and rural China. Currently, the rural
population face different sets of institutions and policies from their urban counterparts. For
instance, the one-child policy does not apply to rural families, and rural residents have a hukou
(account) system that limits their labor mobility. In addition to differences in economic and
institutional norms, the agrarian, rural populations share a social and cultural identity. What
appears ironic is that despite lower wages, longer hours, and more difficult working conditions,
authors have found positive labor relations within TVEs (Byrd and Lin, 1990). In the following
section, I will focus on the idea of social capital, its special role in rural Chinese communities,
and its implications on employment and industry. I believe that the abundance of social capital
within TVEs is the essence of how these economic entities enjoy robust and harmonious labor
relations.
Why Look at Social Capital in the Economy?
Economic research that looks at management-employee relationships often does so
without considering the broader cultural, historical contexts and the embeddedness of social
relations. I argue that the successful economic performance of the TVEs relies precisely on its
unique socio-cultural setting. Granovetter (1985, pp. 486- 487) pointed out, "in economic
models, this treatment of social relations has the paradoxical effect of preserving atomized
decision making even when decisions are seen to involve more than one individual." Any
effective analysis of human action thus requires a shift in the analytical framework towards
embeddedness. (Granovetter, 1985) Granovetter saw the neglect of social structure as one of the
biggest shortcomings in conventional analyses of economic life. Thus, I propose looking at
industrial labor relations in the context of social ties and relationships embedded in the TVEs.
Some sociologists and anthropologists suggest that instead of seeing the economy in a
separate, differentiated sphere where transactions were no longer defined by social or kinship
obligations, social relations could become "an epiphenomenona of the market" (Granovetter,
1985, p. 482). Robert Putnam, too, observed a neglect of social capital issues in economic
development theory. He questions where are the efforts to encourage the formation of social
capital (Putnam, 1993). By understanding the relationship between social networks and
organizational competitiveness, managers, institution reformists and policymakers can design
industrial policies and management tactics that best harvest the valuable capital embedded within
TVEs or other economic agents, or they can encourage creating social capital in their
organizations.
What Is Social Capital?
Social capital refers to the surplus reaped from investing in social relations (Lin et al.,
2001). Lin et al. explained four reasons why embedded resources in social networks can
enhance outcomes of actions. First, it facilitates flow of information regarding opportunities and
choices that are otherwise unavailable; second, its social ties can exert influence on the agents
who play a critical role in decision making that affects the actor; third, social capital serves as
certification of the individual's social credentials; and fourth, social relations can reinforce
identity and recognition (Lin et al., 2001). Burt's (1993) definition of social capital differentiates
it from financial and human capital in two ways: parties jointly own the social capital that is
embedded in the relations to which they are attached; and no one player has exclusive ownership
rights to it. The controversy over the definition of social capital centers around whether it is a
collective or an individual good. According to Lin (200 lb, p. 9), most scholars in fact believe
that it is both. "Institutionalized social relations with embedded resources are expected to benefit
both the collective and the individuals in the collective. At the group level, social capital
represents some aggregation of valued resources (such as economic, political, cultural, or social
as in social connections) or members interacting as a network or networks." They define social
capital as:
resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in
purposive actions. By this definition, the notion of social capital contains three
ingredients: resources embedded in a social structure; accessibility to such social
resources by individuals; and use or mobilization of such social resources by
individuals in purposive actions. Thus conceived, social capital contains three
elements intersecting structure and action: the structural (embeddedness),
opportunity (accessibility) and action-oriented (use) aspects (Lin, 2001b, p. 12).
Social capital exists, albeit in different forms and at different levels, in all societies and
communities. In the rest of this chapter, I examine the specific forms and functions of
social capital in Chinese towns and villages and how it sets the stage for labor relations in
TVEs.
Guanxi: Social Capital with Chinese Characteristics
The Chinese concept of guanxi (social connections) closely resembles the types of social
capital described above. Defined as networks of personal relations, some analysts consider
guanxi to be built-in cultural mechanisms to ensure universalistic rationality for the management
of economic and bureaucratic life (King, 1991). Chinese scholars (e.g., Yan, 1996) have studied
guanxi extensively. However, Yan (1996) pointed out that there was a lack of research on
networks in rural communities. Yan's research of guanxi networks in Xiajia village in
Heilongjiang Province indicated that guanxi networks in the rural context encompass all kinds of
personal relations, including siblings, affiliates, and co-workers. These networks serve
economic, social support, and political functions. Economically, village residents rely heavily
on their guanxi for personal loans and mutual assistance and cooperation in different forms.
Socially, guanxi networks serve as a system of social support in times of life crises by providing
basic needs (e.g., food and shelter) and also by providing moral support (Yan, 1996). Yan's
research found that guanxi networks formed the local moral world in which villagers lived. A
description of rural Chinese society by Fel and Hofer indicates that:
To live in a peasant society means to live in a specific type of production and
reproduction system: household- and village-based, seasonal and labor-intensive
agricultural activity, tightly bounded and densely knit networks, impositions from
outside and above, and under-developed communication with the outside. The
underdeveloped communication and dense, bounded infrastructure meant that
household- and kinship-orientedness were key elements. Hence personal
networks were relatively strong, homogeneous, and local. (discussed in Sik and
Wellman, 1999, p. 248)
The networks described above are congruent with Yan's research findings.
Guanxi serves practical, instrumental purposes in Chinese labor markets. Due to the lack
of labor-market intermediaries (e.g., job-placement agencies), social networks become a crucial
means through which people learn of, and obtain access to, job opportunities (Bian, 1994).
Furthermore, I propose that it "glues" managers and workers together into a harmonious
industrial organizational fabric.
Because many of the TVEs operate in a cultural and social context similar to the one Yan
described, it is logical that workers would want to continue to maintain their guanxi for
economic, social support, and political reasons. Furthermore, many of the workers had been
poor farmers before they participated in industrial activities. Espinoza (1999) pointed out that
the poor in underdeveloped areas often rely on social relationships as a survival strategy. Social
relations form the backbone of a community, upon which people depend for various resources.
For this reason, TVE workers have been pre-conditioned to maintain positive social relationships
in the workplace.
TVEs and Social Capital
TVEs rely heavily on social capital in their operation. On an individual level, workers
and members of the management staff have incentives to preserve the social capital embedded
within their ties and relations to each other. The sum of these ties and the "capital" embedded
therein represent the collective social capital in the closed network that is the TVE plant. Social
capital in TVEs satisfies all three aspects as pointed out by Lin et al. (2001). First, it is
embedded as a result of the close ties and pre-existing relations among the worker/residents in
the township or village. Second, the closed network that is the plant allows everyone within it
access to the collective capital. Finally, I believe that workers and managers translate this capital
into work organization and industrial labor practices that favor regional competitiveness. The
social value system in which TVE managers and workers interact allows TVEs the flexibility to
expand and contract the labor force quickly in response to market conditions, suppress the cost of
labor, and to enter and/or exit the market freely.
In the new post-socialist market economies, the primary example of extensive (beyond
family) social cooperation in daily life is found in the workplace. The entrepreneurial efforts that
arise from existing communes and cooperatives can be particularly effective in post-socialist
societies in preserving "lumps" of social and organizational capital (Stiglitz, 1999). TVEs reap
the social networks and social capital embedded in rural Chinese agrarian communities. On the
management level, it is characteristic of TVE contracts to rely on social ties in transactions.
Analysts such as Weitzman and Xu (1994) consider it to be the primary reason why TVEs are
popular. Friendship is often seen as a requisite for doing business, and managers often try to
develop a friendship before doing business with the other party (Weitzman and Xu, 1994).
Social networks and capital, then, are considered to be part of the enterprise's overall assets, for
they directly impact firms' ability to compete in the market place. "Given the importance of
long term relationships and connections, when there are disputes many TVEs would rather settle
privately instead of relying on the courts because they care more about keeping long-term
connections, even though doing so may hurt their business in the short run" (Weitzman and Xu,
1994, p. 141). The premium attached to establishing long-term relationships and positive social
ties makes the negotiation process more likely to happen and to work effectively.
Byrd and Gelb (1990) found that township and village enterprises (referred to as
Township, Village and Private Enterprises, TVPs) demonstrated "communal characteristics that
distinguish them from most firms in advanced market economies." (Byrd and Gelb, 1990, p. 24)
Despite a lack of worker participation in the management of the plants, workers felt vested in the
companies as they saw a close relationship between their incomes and the firm and community
economic performance. Moreover, workers experienced a high level of job security in these
TVPs and stayed in the firms for relatively long periods of time (Byrd and Gelb, 1990). Social
capital could be the glue that holds TVEs/TVPs together.
Conclusion
As a new-found institution with an ambiguous ownership structure and ill-defined
property rights, Township and Village Enterprises represent an opportunity for employment and
industry in China's countryside. Social capital, in the form of guanxi, serves as an institution
that governs social, industrial, managerial, and business relationships.
If TVEs could reap the guanxi embedded within rural communities to their benefit, they
could potentially establish new norms for positive and constructive management-labor relations.
Beneficial use of guanxi includes trusting and cooperative negotiation processes and incentives
to invest in long-term gains such as employee training. I am proposing that the nature and
structure of TVEs should encourage non-adversarial labor-management relations. Management
has the incentive to preserve the solidarity and good relations with all employees in order to
maintain their reputation and standing. There is an argument among network scholars of
whether reputation is a network asset (Lin, 200 lb). Reputation presumably "reinforces the
legitimacy of certain actors who claim their resources and positions and, at the same time, offers
incentives for further social exchanges and unequal transactions among actors, enhancing their
social capital. It also enhances the group or collective reputation, and thus solidarity and the
building of public capital" (Lin, 2001 a, p. 158). In this theoretical context, management-labor
relations are the future social exchanges. Fostering good relations then becomes the
management's tactic in securing social capital that would allow for "future transactions," mainly
the cooperation and help from workers in times of economic difficulties. This quality in
management-labor relationship is particularly valuable, for TVEs largely compete on their
flexibility and efficiency. Maintaining good reputation and preserving social solidarity allows
the management to bank on flexibility and competitiveness.
Based on the above review theories and research, I hypothesize the following
characteristics in the labor market and labor practices in China's TVEs:
1. Favorable industrial-labor relations characterized by harmonious relationships and
closeness between management and workers;
2. An emphasis on workers' welfare, such as employment security, health and safety, etc.;
3. Workers taking ownership of their company and feeling vested in its performance.
Chapter 5 is a case study of the cokemaking sector in Shanxi Province, China, where I test some
of these hypotheses.
CHAPTER 5
SHANXI COKEMAKING TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISES
This case study looks into how Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) are changing in
ownership, scope, and labor practices. The information presented, and the accompanying
analyses, shed light on questions regarding the future of TVEs as they evolve and grow beyond
the control and jurisdiction of the entrepreneur, the family, or the village. For what should
governments, firms, and laborers be preparing, based on the experiences of the following case
study?
I begin by explaining why Shanxi Cokemaking TVEs deserve our attention when it
comes to studying management-labor issues. Then, I describe the methodology for the case-
study analyses. The analytical framework that I employ is comprised of multiple comparisons.
First, I compare TVEs with Non-Township and Village Enterprises (NTVEs), or State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) at the national level to gain an understanding of these enterprises in
transition. Then, I compare employment and economic activities in Shanxi province with the
rest of China to gain a further understanding of the regional economy. Next, I examine the
cokemaking sector vis-a-vis other industries in Shanxi Province to uncover the characteristics of
this particular industry. The information regarding the Shanxi Province cokemaking sector
comes from four surveys conducted by members of the Alliance for Global Sustainability (AGS)
China Cokemaking team between 1998 and 2001, as well as field visits and on-site interviews
with plant managers in the summer of 2001. I maintain that although China can learn from the
example of her Western, more developed, counterparts, U.S. enterprises and regions in other
countries-in various stages of development-may also gain helpful insights regarding labor
relations from the ways of the Chinese TVEs.
Rationale
TVEs provide an interesting arena in which to study labor relations, for these evolving
economic entities have management and industrial practices that are characteristically different
from those in other Chinese firms that are state-owned, as well as being different from the
traditional industrial firms in the West. I choose to focus on the cokemaing TVEs in Shanxi
Province for three reasons. First, Deng XiaoPeng's economic reforms brought about an
industrial boom in the countryside in Shanxi Province. Small-scale cokemaking TVEs, using
indigenous technologies, proliferated in Shanxi Province's countryside during this boom that
took place in the 1980s. These TVEs continued to evolve and respond to economic,
environmental, and technological challenges in the 1990s and the new millennium. Second,
Shanxi Province forms an interesting comparison with the Pennsylvania case study described in
Chapter 3. These two regions, being on opposite sides of the globe and having industrialized at
different points in time, share similar natural resources and evolution in their industrial
technologies. Shanxi Province and the Monongahela (Mon) Valley are both rich in coal, and
both produce a substantial proportion, respectively, of Chinese and U.S. coke. The Mon Valley
began as a concentration of coal towns, and eventually blossomed into the steel capital of the
world. In the 1980s, the Mon valley was the center of U.S. steel production, dominated by large,
integrated companies that produce coal, coke, iron, and steel. Today, truck-loads of coal and
coke clog Shanxi Province's highways and railways, and large and small coking plants dot the
landscape of the countryside. As the coal, coke, and iron and steel markets globalize, the two
regions find themselves competing in the same markets (International Trade Administration,
2001). Although I have demonstrated that the intensely confrontational industrial labor relations
that dominated the Pennsylvanian industrial labor market was associated with the region's
economic demise in the 1980s, I propose that the labor-market setup in Shanxi Province offers a
window of opportunity for something different. I hypothesize that the relations among
employers and employees and the overall labor-market characteristics in Shanxi Province allow
for a high level of flexibility that can sustain the region in times of rapid economic and
technological changes. Lastly, my participation in the AGS China Cokemaking Project (AGS-
MIT Award Number 005151-042), under the supervision of Professor Karen R. Polenske, has
granted me the access to valuable data and insights into the cokemaking sector (SOEs and TVEs)
in Shanxi Province.
Shanxi Cokemaking TVEs-The Social Capital Perspective
Cokemaking TVEs, with their unique form of ownership and institutional structure take
advantage of the social networks and social capital embedded in rural Chinese agrarian
communities. Originating from the commune system and having close ties with local
governments, TVEs can "incubate and support entrepreneurial efforts" (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 9).
Stiglitz suggested that in the new post-socialist market economies, the primary example of
extensive (beyond family) social cooperation in daily life is found in the workplace, and that
these entrepreneurial efforts (TVEs) that arise from existing communes and cooperatives may be
particularly effective in post-socialist societies in preserving "lumps" of social and
organizational capital (Stiglitz, 1999). On the management level, it is characteristic of TVE
contracts to rely on social ties in transactions. Weitzman and Xu (1994) consider it to be the
primary reason why TVEs are popular. Friendship is often seen as a requisite for doing business,
and managers often try to develop a friendship before doing business with the other party
(Weitzman and Xu, 1994). Social networks and capital, then, are considered to be part of the
enterprise's overall assets. "Given the importance of long-term relationships and connections,
when there are disputes, many TVEs would rather settle privately instead of relying on the courts
because they care more about keeping long-term connections, even though doing so may hurt
their business in the short run" (Weitzman and Xu, 1994, p. 141).
I suspect that the abundance of social capital makes TVEs more resilient, thus allowing
them flexibility and freedom on labor issues. In the case study that follows, I test this hypothesis
based on firm-level labor practices, such as employee training, employee health and safety, and
job prospects and security.
Methodology
I examine the Shanxi Cokemaking sector based on different sources of information. For
the comparison between Chinese TVEs and SOEs, and the overall socio-economic and regional
differences between Shanxi Province and other parts of China, I consult statistical yearbooks
published by state and regional statistical authorities in China from the mid-1990s to 2001.
These published statistics provide an overall picture of the nature, structure, and institutional
evolution of the TVEs. I use data collected from the AGS China Cokemaking Project surveys on
SOEs and TVEs (1998- 2001) to examine the business and labor practices within this specific
industry. These surveys contain questions on the enterprises' employment practices, ownership
structure, and supply-chain relationships. Members of the AGS China Cokemaking Project
Team administered the two TVE surveys in 1998 and 2000, sampling 158 and 164 plants,
respectively (31 of which are common to both surveys). The matched sample of 31 common
plants is particularly helpful for looking at the changes and evolution of practices within
cokemaking enterprises in the course of three years. (Map 1) They also conducted two SOE
surveys in 1999 and 2001, with information of 8 plants being gathered in the earlier year, and 49
in the later. Finally, I visited 6 cokemaking enterprises (under various ownership structures) in
Shanxi Province in the summer of 2001 with the AGS China Cokemaking team. I observed
plant operations and met with managers and workers. The AGS China Cokemaking Project team
interviewed plant managers regarding their plant's history and evolution, business outlook,
technology choice, and health and safety/employment practices. I include quotes and excerpts
from the managers' narratives in this case study.
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) Versus Non Township and Village Enterprises
(NTVEs)
Township and Village Enterprises have consistently been more economically efficient
than state-owned enterprises in China, and they have accounted for an increasing share of the
nation's total output (Mahdavi, 2001). TVEs' share of gross industrial output rose from 10% in
1980 to 45% in 1993; by 1993, together with urban industrial "collectives" and fully private
firms, they accounted for a majority (57%) of China's industrial production (Cable, 1996). In
1998, TVE output accounted for 28% of China's gross domestic product (GDP) (ChinaOnline,
2000).
There are various reasons for the TVEs' impressive economic performance. Some of
these reasons are exogenous, e.g., increased globalization and a sizeable domestic market, yet
others are endogenous to the nature of TVEs, and the contexts in which they operate. Among
them are:
1. Fiscal vigilance. TVEs face "hard" budget constraints because local governments cannot
engage in deficit financing.
2. Community support. Any surpluses accrue to local communities (and their leaders) so
that they have a stake, in terms of both income and prestige, in the success of the
enterprise.
3. Intense competition in domestic (and increasingly overseas) markets.
4. Market forces. Local governments, unlike the national government, are not able to
protect TVEs from competition, and rivalry between different locales for resources and
partners is a powerful stimulus for TVEs to strive for efficiency.
5. Professional management. Due to competitive pressures, there is a corresponding
motivation to de-politicize enterprises and to bring in professional management.
6. Flexible labor market. Because there is no job security and (thus) none of the politically
constrained approach to enterprise management associated with the "iron rice bowl"
mentality in state-owned enterprises, firms can expand or contract their labor force as
required, in a flexible labor market.
7. Low cost of labor that can be cut in adverse market conditions. Other forms of regulation
are lightly applied, if at all (Mahdavi, 2001).
These inherent flexibility and comparative advantages of the TVEs allow and encourage them to
engage in labor-intensive production methods. In addition, the rural labor market appears to
have relatively free entry and exit. Our conversations with plant managers suggest that when
labor is laid off from the plants, the workers are seldom left totally unemployed. This is because
TVE employees are farmers who can return to farming full-time.
TVEs, in general, have lower labor costs than non-TVEs. Throughout China, TVEs'
share of compensation to labor is lower than their share of output. Based on 1980s data, labor
employed per unit of output by TVEs averaged around two-and-a-half times that of state firms
(and over twice that of "small" state firms"), while private firms had five times the labor
intensity of state firms (Jefferson and Rawski, 1994). In 1996, Non-TVEs have value-added per
employee that is twice as great, but capital expenditures per employee is almost three times as
much (Mahdavi 2001). Born out of a movement towards marketization of the economy, the
small-scale, non-state nature of TVEs rids them of social welfare obligations of state-owned
work units. Social welfare costs are lower among TVEs than non-TVEs. In 1999, NTVEs on
average spent 490 Renminbi (RMB) a year in social welfare costs compared with 149 RMB/year
in TVEs (Mahdavi, 2001). Because of an input-mix that is labor-intensive with low capital
investments and capital expenses, TVEs are more capital efficient, but have lower productivity
of labor compared to NTVEs. This means, TVEs are capable of generating a substantial amount
of employment in China's countryside and at lower costs than state-owned firns.
The total number of employed persons in China rose from 688 million in 1996 to 712
million in 2000. The most noticeable change during this period is the doubling of employment
in private enterprises in both urban and rural areas. During this period, employment in rural
China changed minimally (2%), but the types of employment changed a great deal. At the
inception in 1978, TVEs employed 28.3 million workers, which was 9.2% of all rural employees.
TVE employees rose to 128.6 million by 1995 representing 28.6% of the rural labor force, 18.9%
of national employment (Chen Hongyi, 2000). Between 1996 and 2000, TVE employment
dropped by 5%, the number of self-employed individuals in rural China decreased by 11%,
whereas the number of employees in rural private enterprises increased from 5.6 million to 11.4
million. Together, TVEs (128 million employed persons), private enterprises (11 million
employed persons) and self-employed individuals (29 million employed persons) constitute 34%
of all rural jobs (the majority of which remain in agriculture) in China in 2000 (China Statistical
Yearbook, 2001). The majority (70% in 2000) of the rural jobs in Shanxi Province remains in
the agricultural sector (Shanxi Staistical Yearbook, 2001)
Although rural TVEs provided 18% of all jobs in China in 2000 (712 million total), they
only accounted for 12% of total investment in fixed assets (China Statistical Yearbook, 2001).
This is evidence that given the same level of capital investment, TVEs are more efficient and
effective in generating employment opportunities. This makes the TVEs favorable candidates
for investment if the provision of jobs were of concern.
Shanxi Province Compared with Rest of China
Shanxi Province is situated in the northwest of China (Map 2). The region is rich in coal
reserves and has an endowment of other minerals such as iron, bauxite, ferromanganese, copper,
lead and zinc (New China News Agency, 2002). In addition to cokemaking, Shanxi Province has
cement, mining machinery, steel rolling mills and textile machinery industries; at the same time,
its light industry and textile industry are developing at a high speed (UN-ESCAP, 2002). Due to
the Province's rich endowment in coal, it can support a growing cokemaking sector.
Cokemaking has accounted for increasing shares of the total value-added from Shanxi province
in the past decade. In 1985, cokemaking barely contributed to the Shanxi economy; by 1992, the
coke sector still accounted for only 1% of Shanxi Province's total value-added. By 2000, it rose
to 6% (Figure 5.1).
Shanxi Province is predominantly rural, but has urbanized some since the economic
reforms of the late 1970s. In 2000, 73% of the Provincial population lived in rural areas,
compared to 90% in the 1950s (Figure 5.2). On average, the population in Shanxi Province has
education levels that are below the national mean. The level of female labor force participation
in Shanxi Province is also significantly below the national average. The rate of female labor
force participation (staff and workers) was 14% in Shanxi Province in 2000, compared to 35%
China-wide (Figure 5.3). On the other hand, staff and workers employed at Shanxi's Township
and Village Enterprises have educational attainments that are significantly higher than the
general population in the Province, and are comparable with the national average among staff
and workers in other Chinese provinces.
The total working population in Shanxi Province has grown in recent years, translating
into increased farm and non-farm employment. Low marginal product of farm labor makes it
easy and beneficial for farmers to switch from agriculture to non-farm activities. The past
decade has been marked by (1) shrinking of farm areas; (2) increasing use of machinery in
farming; and (3) increasing participation in farming activities (rising number of farm employees)
(China Statistical Yearbooks, 1996- 2001). All these factors contribute to a decreasing marginal
productivity of farm labor. At the same time, employment in collectively owned TVEs has
declined, mirrored by rising employment levels in privately owned TVEs. The question of
interest then becomes, do privately owned TVEs hire more or fewer people than the collectively
owned TVEs? In general, workers in Shanxi Province are slightly more likely to be employed at
a TVE (20%) than in the rest of China (18%). What is surprising is that employment among
Shanxi's State-Owned Enterprises appears to have increased recently, despite a downward
national trend (Figure 5.4).
Wages in Shanxi Province were lower than the national average across all enterprise
types in 2000. This represents a shift from the pattern in 1998, when staff and workers in
Shanxi's collectively owned and privately owned TVEs had higher-than-national wage rates
(Figures 5.5 and 5.6). It is, however, possible that the different sources of the wage data for the
two years account for the contradictory evidence.
In Shanxi province, State-owned units represent the majority of the total fixed asset
investment (63%) compared to 50% for the national average. Rural collective units in Shanxi
Province only invested in 6% of the Province's total fixed assets, whereas the national average is
12% (China Statistical Yearbook, 2001). This could be due to the nature of the industries (with
Shanxi Province concentrating on mining and agriculture) or the choice of technology and
capital/labor mix of the rural industries. Again, this is supportive evidence that TVEs are more
labor-intensive and capital efficient. Because of the labor-intensive and capital-efficient natures
of TVE production, they are more effective than the non-TVEs in generating industrial
employment in the countryside than the SOEs.
Shanxi Cokemaking Sector
In 1999, Shanxi Province accounted for 41% of the total coke output in China, and is one
of the dominant exporters of coke in the global market (China Steel Yearbook, 2000; Shanxi
Statistical Yearbook, 2000). According to the Chinese TVE Yearbooks (1996- 1999), of the
2682 Petroleum Processing and Coking TVEs in China in 1998, 907 were in Shanxi Province.
Shanxi also employed 75,660 of the 158,006 Petroleum Processing and Coking TVE workers in
China (48%). This means on average, the Petroleum Processing and Coking TVEs in Shanxi
have more workers than those in other provinces (83 versus 59 in 1998). Although Chinese
official statistics group Petroleum Processing and Cokemaking into the same industry category,
the Petroleum Processing (TVE) sector is virtually non-existent in Shanxi Province. Therefore,
it is safe to assume that all of the TVEs reported in the Petro Processing and Coking TVEs in
Shanxi Province are cokemaking TVEs (Fang, 3/20/2002). There is also an upward trend in
number of employees in Shanxi Coking TVEs, rising from an average of 66 in 1995 to 83 in
1998 (Table 5.1). Our survey findings support these trends in that the mean, mode, and median
number of employees have risen for the 164 plants between 1995 (mean of 207, median of 110,
and mode of 80) and 2000 (mean of 269, median of 120, and mode of 120) (Figure 5.7). It also
appears, however, that our survey has a sample of coking plants that employ more people than
the Coking TVE sector average for Shanxi Province.
Description of the Workforce
Although Cokemaking TVEs are increasing in size (defined by number of employees),
the total number of employees working in Shanxi Cokemaking TVEs has decreased in recent
years. This trend is complemented by a slight increase in cokemaking SOE employees. Overall,
the total number of people employed in the cokemaking sector in the five surveyed regions in
Shanxi Province declined from 96 thousand employees in 1995 to 75 thousand in 2001 (Figure
5.8).
Despite the increase in enterprise size (in employment terms), the composition of the
workforce appears to change little over time. In both 1998 and 2000, Shanxi cokemaking TVEs
had a Production Worker: Technical Staff: Administrative Staff: Other Workers breakdown of
78%: 8%: 11%: 2%. Furthermore, this breakdown closely mimics that of cokemaking SOEs in
the Province (78%: 9%: 7%: 5%) (Table 5.2).
Workers' Compensation
How do wages in Shanxi cokemaking TVEs compare to other industries? Wages are a
good basis for comparison in order to understand the quality of the labor relations, labor
productivity, and the nature of the labor market. Unfortunately, the AGS cokemaking project
has scarce and incomplete data on employee wages and other in-kind benefits. In the 1998 TVE
survey, they did ask managers the aggregate amount spent on employee compensation, but it is
unclear what employee compensation consists of (i.e., whether it includes all wage and non-wage
benefits). Furthermore, among the 158 firms surveyed, only 66 provided answers to this
question. Nonetheless, I find that employee compensation, on average, accounted for 8% of the
firms' flow assets (compared to 12% for transportation, 7% for depreciation, and 8% for taxes,
among other things). The aggregated amount (Total Employee Compensation) divided by the
total number of employees (all categories) yields a crude measure of annual average employee
compensation, which amounts to 6,289 RMB/employee /year in 1998.
Although the SOEs in China have historically served both economic and social welfare
functions, the TVEs generally do not bear the burden of social provisions. Nonetheless, I
discovered from our site visits that TVE employees still enjoyed some fringe benefits (however
minimal), such as medical check-ups and subsidized lunches at company cafeterias (Figure 5.9).
Some of the coke workers also live in employee quarters on company property, often in close
proximity to the cokemaking facilities.
Based on very limited observation from the field, the production workforce in Shanxi
Province cokemaking TVEs seem to be overwhelmingly young and male. When I asked a few
workers about their ages, they either declined to answer, or said they were 18 years old. I had no
way of telling whether these responses were a function of shyness, or the fact that labor
regulations prevented anyone under the age of 18 from working in coke plants.
Educational Attainment
How do workers employed within the cokemaking sector match up to the general
population in Shanxi Province in terms of educational attainment? I look at the different staff
categories in a cokemaking facility and their educational attainment separately. Production
workers are responsible for the majority of the operations within a cokemaking facility. Their
responsibilities range from loading and unloading coal and coke, to driving quenching cars, to
operating oven doors, to handling and transporting the final coke products. Technical workers
are responsible for the well-functioning of the equipment in the plant. A typical member of the
technical staff would sit in front of meters and machines for 8 hours a day, with 5-minute breaks
every hour, to ensure that the readings are normal. Administrative staff includes plant managers
and office workers. On average, the administrative staff has the highest educational attainment,
followed by technical and then production staff. None of the production workers surveyed in the
1998 TVE survey had more than 12 years of schooling; in 2000, only 1% of the production
workers had more than 12 years of schooling. The overall educational attainment among the
Technical Staff employed in TVEs fell from 1998 to 2000. This coincided with an increase in
the proportion of workers at the lower end of the educational attainment spectrum (6 years or
less). Unlike the Technical Staff, Administrative Staff surveyed in the TVEs had an overall
improvement in educational attainment between 1998 and 2000. A higher proportion of them
received 12 to 18 years of schooling. SOE workers in all three categories had higher educational
attainment (Figure 5.10).
These survey results lead to two speculations. First, the lower educational attainment
among technical workers, administrative workers and managers at the TVEs compared to SOEs
implies that TVEs provide more job and income mobility. Workers without many years of
schooling can move away from farming activities to becoming industrial managers. Second, the
increase in educational attainment among TVE administrative staff, but not the other job
categories, leads to a widening gap in education between management and rank-and-file workers.
As discussed in the Mon Valley story (Chpater 3), this divide can lead to mistrust and hostility in
labor-management relations.
Job Training
An objective of economic growth is to enhance people's capacities to reach their full
potential in achieving what they want. Although this can certainly be achieved through creation
of employment opportunities and higher incomes, the skills and personal responsibility
dimensions of work ought not be neglected. Here, I use employee training as a proxy for TVEs'
contribution towards human development. In 1998, 10% of TVE production workers received
no training for their jobs. At the same time, a majority (49%) of them received one week of
training. According to Professor Fang from the Taiyuan University of Technology in Shanxi
Province, "training" usually refers to
companies offering courses to employees on technical and administrative
knowledge for different working positions, because the new workers are from the
farms and are lowly educated. Some companies offer other new or advanced
courses to older workers or office workers so that they can take on new work
responsibilities. [As I know] a lot of coke plant have had their persons participate
in classes on environmental regulations and measurements, and IS09000 ,
ISO14000, etc. (Fang, 2002b).
By the year 2000, only 4% of TVE production workers received no training. At the same time,
however, employers seemed to have substituted one-day training for longer, more
comprehensive types of training programs. Only 44% of the production employees in 2000
received one week or more training, compared to 78% in 1998. Ninety percent of SOE
production workers received training that lasted for one week or longer. The training situations
for the technical and administrative staff appear somewhat similar to production workers.
Between 1998 and 2000, a lower percentage of workers from either category received no
training. Among those who receive training, however, a high proportion of workers in either job
category engaged in shorter-term training (one day to one week). The majority of technical and
administrative staff at SOEs received one month of training (Figure 5.11).
Aside from formal training programs, workers can accrue skills and expertise through
work itself. Employment duration at cokemaking enterprises can provide us with a sense of the
quality of the work force, as well as employment mobility and organizational loyalty among
coke workers. When cokemaking TVEs first came into existence, the entrepreneurs and workers
were first-generation industrial workers, who had previously worked in the agricultural sector.
In 1998, 18% of the TVE production workers were new (had worked for 1 year or less). This
dropped to 13% by 2000. The majority of the workers in all three job categories had worked for
one to five years in 1998, and this trend continued through 2000, except that the majority of the
administrative staff had five or more years of experience by 2000. This is not surprisingly given
the managerial and supervisory nature of the administrative positions. On the other hand,
cokemaking SOEs in our survey consisted primarily of experienced workers with five or more
years of experience. This difference is not surprising, considering that the cokemaking TVEs are
a relatively new sector in Shanxi Province. These numbers also support the hypothesis that SOE
workers do not appear to be shifting to TVEs for employment (Figures 5.12). However, based
on our interviews, I learned that two of the plant managers interviewed had previously been local
government employees. This further demonstrates the intricate relationship between the private
and the public realms within the rural industrial sector in China.
Workers' Safety
Cokemaking facilities are dangerous environments in which to work. Ovens operate at
high temperatures, and the equipment is heavy and awkward. Furthermore, the cokemaking
ovens, especially those that employ lower-end technologies, are highly polluting. Coke plants
have piles of exposed coal, from which coal dust may be released, and spontaneous combustion
can occur (due to the exposure to the sun and trapped heat). During the coking process,
carcinogenic gases and substances (benzene, toluene, xylene, sulphur dioxide, etc.) are often
released into the air, the land, and the water (Polenske and McMichael, forthcoming). Health
and safety of workers should therefore be of primary concern to the enterprises. Overall, TVEs
seem to have increased their awareness of the importance of workers safety over the two-survey
period, reflected in the increased adoption of various measures. The most popular forms of
health and safety measures are safety instructions, helmets, hard shoes, and eye-goggles (Table
5.3). In 2000, TVE plants, on average, adopted three to six safety measures (Table 5.4). True to
their paternalistic and welfare-serving nature, SOEs adopted more safety measures than TVEs.
Almost all workers in SOEs had to wear helmets and were given safety instructions (Table 5.3).
The following are excerpts from our on-site interview with an SOE plant manager in Taiyuan.
Reduction of pollutants emission not only protects the ambient environment, but
also protects the body of ourselves. The environmental awareness among workers
has increased substantially. ... We restricted the maximum working time on
poisonous and high pollutants emission positions. Usually workers on these
positions must shift to other (safer) positions after working 3-5 years. The [SOE]
regularly arranges for the worker to take physical examinations and tracks the
examination results. There is a medical center of the [SOE]. To ensure the
accuracy of the examination results, the [SOE] has kept in touch with the
Occupational Disease Prophylactic and Therapeutic Hospital of Shanxi Province
(ODPHSP). The ODPHSP holds an annual physical examination for the workers
on polluted positions (poisonous and high polluted positions). The workers found
with negative examination results need to be checked. The [SOE] will take active
measures for any worker whose physical condition has worsened. Anyway, there
have been no such workers apparently suffering from the working environment so
far. The Workers' Union and (Production) Safety Unit of the [SOE] together
supervise the annual physical examination and workers health protection program.
Workers have been generally satisfied with the program. (On-site interview,
Summer 2001).
From the manager's narrative, we get a sense that workers' safety and health are high on the
management's priority.
Although being state-owned or township-and village-owned certainly affected the
enterprise's provision of workers health and safety, the difference is not pronounced among the
various TVE ownership types (Table 5.5). From our interviews, one of the TVE plant mangers
describes their provisions for employee healthcare and safety as follows:
On the factory site there is a clinic, which can solve minor illnesses. The
company may be responsible for the injuries suffered on job. Serious injuries
would be treated in other hospitals. Besides, each worker will be subsidized 4-5
RMB per month for health care. (On-site interviews, Summer 2001)
This type of healthcare provision is not uncommon among the plants that we visited. However,
one gets the sense from walking around the facilities that management's mentality towards
employee health and safety are directed towards fixing problems as they arise (e.g., hospital
treatments), as opposed to taking preventative measures (e.g. wearing helmets, masks, hard
shoes, etc.). Despite physical signs with pictures and verbal warnings hanging everywhere, not
all workers performing high-risk tasks were properly equipped (Exhibits 3 and 4).
Ownership and Finance
One of my premises in this study is that the cooperative nature in ownership and
management of the TVEs give them the competitive edge through positive labor relations and
flexibilities. Interesting, I found that most of the TVEs surveyed in 1998 were self-owned or
publicly listed (shareholding) (Figure 5.14). When I look at sources of finance for these
enterprises, the results indicate that only a small minority (3%) of the plants financed their fixed
assets with resources from townships and villages. Banks are the major financiers (38%),
followed by sales of output (3 1%) and family funds (17%). These findings suggest that TVEs
may actually be abandoning their communal nature, and have-in recent years-grown
increasingly similar to the traditional "capitalist" enterprises in terms of ownership and finance
mechanisms.
In order to find out the changing ownership structures of TVEs, I look at the sample of 31
common plants (surveyed in 1998 and again in 2000). Cross-tabulating the ownership of the
plants in 1998 against their ownership in 2000 yields interesting results (Table 5.6). Most of the
plants surveyed underwent a change in ownership between 1998 and 2000, although in no
noticeable direction. Cross-section data indicate, however, that there is a surge in self-owned
and shareholding firms since 1993 (Figure 5.15).
To examine the effect of shifting ownership on labor, I look at the 158 plants surveyed in
1998 (66 of which responded to the workers' compensation question). The sample average for
annual workers' compensation is 6289 RMB/employee/year. Village-owned TVEs spent the
most on employees (7,792 RMB), whereas shareholding and township TVEs spent the least
(5,867 RMB and 5.6521 RMB respectively) (Figure 5.16).
Asset-Employment Trade-off
I now turn to what affects employment decisions. The surge of TVEs created a lot of
industrial employment for Shanxi Province's farmers. Faced with increased domestic demand
and a growing global demand for Chinese coke, Shanxi Province's coke output also increased.
However, with the availability of more efficient technologies, better ovens, and pressures from
the environmental agencies, TVEs may opt to shut down, or upgrade their production
technologies and facilities. Recall the Mon Valley experience. U.S. steel companies often opted
for the technology options that were labor-unfriendly when confronted by environmental
regulatory constraints. The 2000 TVE survey data indicate that a sizeable number of TVEs
underwent some type of expansion between 1995 and 2000. Unfortunately, from our survey we
have no way of telling how many plants actually shut down, thus having to lay of employees,
during the same period. Of the plants that expanded, the majority of them also hired more
people in 2000 than in 1995 (Table 5.8). What is striking is that the firms that increased
employment were, in general, smaller firms in 1995, compared to those that underwent
expansion but decreased employment. In essence, the larger plants (in terms of number of
employees) are the ones that substitute capital investments for labor. For policy-making, this
finding implies that to preserve employment in the cokemaking sector, policy makers would
want to encourage investments in the smaller plants, as opposed to the larger ones.
In addition to the number of workers hired, asset-employment tradeoff also involves the
balance between investing in capital (e.g., technology, plant facilities, etc.) and investing in
human capital (e.g., workers' training). I have two hypotheses that would have contradictory
effects. First, if labor (human capital) and capital were true substitutes, then higher levels of
capital investment would be correlated with low levels of investment in workers' training. This
is consistent with the "containment" hypothesis where workers are de-skilled and are stuck with
repetitive tasks as management invests in technology (Chapter 2). The other hypothesis,
however, is that the richer and bigger a cokemaking plant is, the better it can afford to train
workers. Furthermore, more advanced equipment that is associated with plant expansion may
require more skillful operators, making training a must. Table 5.9 represents a matrix of the
tradeoff between the firms' fixed-asset investments and their time investment in labor training.
Although all of the plants that did not provide employee training fall within the low-end of the
fixed-assets investments spectrum (1- 300 million Renminbi in 2000), there is no observable
pattern of differences across the various investment distributions. Looking at the relationship
between training and the level of total capital in 2000 also leads to similar conclusions (Table
5.10): all of those that did not provide training for production workers fell within the first decile
of total capital distribution.
Technology
As enforcement of environmental regulations becomes increasingly imminent, and
demand for Chinese coke exports surges, cokemakers in Shanxi Province must upgrade their
equipment and technologies to increase production capacity, as well as to upgrade to cleaner
technologies to meet environmental standards. In his thesis, Chen Hao (2000) discovered that
coke plants that employed new, cleaner technologies devoted less of their total expenditures on
labor remuneration relative to the smaller ovens using more backwards technologies. 3 To
expand this line of research one step further, I look at the relationship between average labor
compensation (per capita) and technology used at the plants among the 158 plants surveyed in
1998. A plant using the PX oven formed the lower end of the spectrum, spending 1,117 RMB
per employee per year in compensation. Employees at non-recovery (SJ-96) plants had below-
average compensations of 5,832 RMB/year, compared to the high end of 10,526 RMB/
employee/ year at 2H-II ovens (Figure 5.17). Overall, it appears that except for firms using
indigenous technologies (namely, PX ovens) that pay employees significantly less, the
relationship between technology choice and employee compensation is unclear based on the
3 According to Chen Hao (2000), labor represented 5.2% of total costs of operating small machinery ovens,
compared to 4.7% for JKH-97 (advanced modified indigenous), 3.4% for SJ-96 (Non-recovery).
data. Unfortunately, due to the small sample sizes for each technology, there are high degrees of
variance attached to these figures.
Enterprise Structure and Business Outlook
Generally, metallurgical industries in the world are characterized by high degrees of
vertical integration. The U.S. steel industry is representative of how companies internalize their
supply chain to gain control, flexibility, and economies of scale.
Figure 5.18 is a graphic representation of development trajectories by two cokemaking
enterprises in Shanxi Province. This should provide an overall idea on the evolution of the
industry, and the changing nature and structure of these rapidly growing companies. One of
them is state-owned, the other a TVE.
Both the SOE and the TVE in the following examples expanded and diversified their
products beyond cokemaking. Both companies eventually internalized their entire supply chain.
Notably, the TVE expanded business horizontally and evolved into a conglomerate firm that
reaches above and beyond the metallurgy sector. Based on the two cases and conversations with
managers from other plants, there is a salient trend towards shareholding ownership. Whether
these cokemaking enterprises started as farmers' communes or state-owned units, there is an
overwhelming preference for switching towards shareholding in order to generate capital for
business expansion (Figure 5.15). This type of fundraising mechanism and corporate ownership
are new in China.
Figure 5.18: DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORIES OF Two COKEMAKING ENTERPRISES
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Source: Field visit, 2001 and on-site interviews with plant managers.
The trend towards product diversification and public (shareholding) ownership has labor-
market implications. On one hand, having diversified their industrial outputs and markets,
cokemaking TVEs are less susceptible to market pressures in the coke market. It also reduces
risks and increases resilience of the enterprises in the face of rapid technological changes
(affecting the demand for coke) and the potential for eventual de-industrialization (affecting the
regional economy). Workers enjoy better job security as they can shift from one industry to
another in response to changing product-market conditions. On the other hand, shifting from
collective or private, family ownership to shareholding would likely affect the management of
the TVEs. Although I have postulated that the unique ownership, and hence management styles,
of the TVEs should provide an opportunity for flexible and favorable management-labor
interactions, shareholding ownership is often associated with professional management. In the
Mon Valley case (Chapter 3), bringing in college graduates as managers deteriorated the labor
relations in the steel plants. A widening educational gap between management and production
workers in the Shanxi cokemaking facilities is thus susceptible to similar fate. A professionally
managed firm may no longer benefit from the informal and communal characteristic (and the
resulting flexibility and efficiency) from which the TVEs have benefited.
Conclusion
The purpose of the case study, using published, survey, and site-visit data, is to paint a
picture of cokemaking activities in the countryside of Shanxi Province. In the past two decades,
cokemaking has generated sizeable income and industrial employment in the Province. I have
used this case study to examine this recent regional economic growth phenomenon from the
labor perspective. With respect to maintaining the welfare and well-being of the labor force,
TVEs compare unfavorably with SOEs. Shanxi TVEs pay employees lower wages and provide
fewer benefits. Over time, however, we do observe improvements in attention to workers' health
and safety and training among cokemaking TVEs. Even so, SOEs are still superior in terms of
wage and welfare provisions.
Throughout this study, I have postulated ways in which Chinese TVEs achieve their
competitive advantages. I have also discussed how a major strength of the TVEs lies in their
positive labor relations, which, in turn, create flexibility that favors these enterprises in a
competitive global market. I now recap the salient aspects regarding the Shanxi Province
cokemaking sector presented in the case. Moreover, I revisit the hypotheses about township and
village enterprises and labor that I put forth initially, juxtaposing them with evidence from the
case study, as well as literature.
Hypothesis: The Maoist Communist Ideal of the "The Right to Work"
Township and Village Enterprises, with their community ownership structure, offers an
opportunity for reassuring people's right to work, as they are at the same time the owners and the
laborers in the enterprises. Paradoxically, the right to work does not translate into workers'
rights in contemporary rural China. Workers in China remain silenced, and the organization of
labor remains, to a large extent, just a bureaucracy. Based on the AGS cokemaking surveys,
workers in TVEs enjoy fewer rights than their SOE counterparts. TVE employees do not enjoy
as high wages and as many non-wage benefits, work under more hazardous conditions, and are
less prepared for their jobs. TVE employees also have relatively insecure job tenure compared to
the SOE employees, who at least until now are essentially guaranteed lifetime employment.
Much of the TVEs' competitive advantage lies in their ability to have the farming sector absorb
excess, laid-off labor in times of organizational restructuring.
Hypothesis: Positive Employment Effects of TVEs
Recently published Chinese statistics reiterate Mahdavi's (2001) proposition that TVEs
are more labor intensive and more capital efficient, hence more effective in generating
employment given a fixed level of investments. However, based on the samples of cokemaking
plants surveyed in five regions in Shanxi Province, the period of 1995 to 2001 saw an overall
decrease in employment in the cokemaking sector, despite the growth in TVEs' contribution to
Provincial output. More ironically, during the same period (1995- 2001), employment in
cokemaking SOEs in Shanxi Province increased slightly.
Hypothesis: A Dual Labor Market
Based on the discussions and studies presented in Chapter 4, I suggest that TVEs and
SOEs tap into different labor pools. This is because SOE workers have little incentive to leave
their comprehensive employment packages. Furthermore, the demographics (e.g., educational
attainment) of TVE and SOE workers are rather different, suggesting that the two sectors face
different labor supplies. Although I suspect that this hypothesis holds true for the majority of the
workers, evidence from the field indicates that there are in fact cross-overs between the TVE and
the public (government, SOE) sector. Despite my sample of interviewees being far from
representative, there is a trend for managerial and administrative staff to leave the state sector
towards more private and market-oriented enterprises as China undergoes institutional reform
and rapid economic growth.
Hypothesis: Companies Substitute Capital for Labor
Evidence from the TVE surveys suggests that cokemaking TVEs do not usually substitute
capital for labor. Contrary to speculation, companies actually hired more workers as their
operations expanded, and their investments in fixed-assets increased. Unfortunately, data used to
estimate the relationship between technology choice and employee compensation are inadequate
to generate any meaningful results.
Hypothesis: Ownership matters
Survey data indicate that TVEs adjust ownership structures rapidly. TVEs are
increasingly shifting away from township/village/joint ownership towards self and shareholding
ownership. These movements suggest that to some degree, ownership must matter in a firm's
operations.
Whether a firm is state-owned or not affects its provision of workers' health and safety
precautions, training, and benefits. Within TVEs, however, different forms of ownership,
ranging from private individual ownership, to joint-ventures, to public shareholding, do not
appear to affect labor practices significantly.
The pressure to raise capital for business expansion, however, has led TVEs increasingly
to turn to publicly listed private ownership (shareholding). Although ownership does not directly
affect labor practices, the shift of ownership away from the township and village communities
may have future impacts on management style, business decisions, industry outlook, and
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eventually have regional and labor impacts. Even within the SOEs, attempts to pull themselves
out of bankruptcy have led to the birth of joint stock companies where workers are forced to
purchase shares of the company.
Hypothesis: Problems with Company Towns
In Chapter 3, I described how the company towns in the Mon Valley brewed contentious
relationships between the managerial class and the working class and eventually became
completely vulnerable to the business cycle. In the Mon Valley, businesses "owned" the towns.
Shanxi Province is also comprised of company towns. These company towns are different in
that the ownership is in reverse: the communities are the ones that own the businesses residing in
the town. Whereas the residents in the Mon Valley felt trapped and disenfranchised, TVEs
empower residents of towns and villages through their stake and ownership. Do residents, who
are almost always the workers, feel empowered? I have no way of telling. However, an
important point to note is that while township and village communities in theory have ownership,
so do local governments, foreign capitalists, and local entrepreneurs, as a result of the
"innovative" ownership structure of TVEs. It is unclear, and highly unlikely, that workers/
owners can easily and readily access the resources embedded in the TVEs, and/or get to
participate in business decision making and strategic planning actively.
Final Remarks
Results from my case study suggest different possibilities for the future of coke workers
in Shanxi Province. On the one hand, TVEs' expansion into other industries is not possible
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without switching towards capital-intensive production methods. This could potentially displace
workers and lower their bargaining power. On the other hand, adoption of capital-intensive
technologies does not appear to affect significantly either the quality or quantity of employment.
In the long run, investing in technology can safeguard the regional industrial competitiveness,
thus protecting jobs and employment.
What about social capital? In the beginning of the chapter, I hypothesized that the dense
social networks within TVEs and a management style that harnesses social capital would render
them more flexible and resilient economic entities. As a whole (all entities classified as TVEs in
the case study), TVEs' abilities to "get away" with sub-optimal provisions for their employees,
while at the same time being welcomed, economically viable institutions suggest that their
unique settings in the social and cultural landscape must have played a role. However, the extent
to which these social network forces are at play and the measurement of such forces are beyond
the scope of the surveys and this case study. TVEs' changing ownership structures, however,
questions whether the conventional TVE model-with its reliance on familial and community
ties-is likely to persist and how labor practices and relations will be affected. At this point, it
appears that we can only speculate based on theory, past experiences, and examples from other
places.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
Traversing from peasantry to industry, what are the advantages and challenges that
township and village enterprises in rural China have, or have to anticipate? As a conclusion to
this research on cokemaking Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in Shanxi Province,
China, I recap and re-examine the hypotheses surrounding the relationship between labor
relations and regional growth, as well as case study results and lessons learned. I do this by
revisiting the two levels of comparisons and re-examining their validity: first between the Shanxi
Province coke industry and the Monongahela (Mon) Valley integrated steel sector, and then
between TVEs and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Finally, I point to the issues that deserve
particular attention, and I discuss their implications on the future of regional growth, labor
markets, institutions, and public policy.
Monongahela Valley in the mid-1980s and Shanxi Province in the late-1990s
I use case studies of the Mon Valley and Shanxi Province regional economies to illustrate
the symbiotic relationship between industrial labor relations and the resilience and performance
of regional economies. Although the case studies focused on two regions that are on opposite
ends of the world in different time periods, hence are mired in very different social, cultural,
economic and institutional contexts, they nonetheless share a number of similarities. The two
regions are similar in that (1) both relied on coal in their early stages of regional development;
(2) both regions had labor practices characterized by minimal attention to training and
investment in human capital; and (3) labor is "immobile." The two cases are different in that (1)
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they took place in two different time periods; (2) the two regions had divergent industry
structures; (3) the two regions adopted different growth strategies, and (4) the two regions
resided on different social, cultural and political landscapes, which translated into different
practices, expectations, and power dynamics. These differences are important to note when
comparing the two regions in search for "best practice" for growth. Like comparing apples with
oranges, labor relations in Shanxi Province and the Mon Valley are too different to serve as each
other's counterfactuals. I, however, show how different institutions can translate into different
labor practices and labor practices, and how they, in turn, affect economic performance. Also,
these differences point towards how innovative and experimental institutional structures, such as
the TVEs, can foster good labor relations to make regional growth sustainable. In this section, I
first summarize the similarities in the two regions' growth trajectories, and then I discuss the
differences.
Similarities
Both the Mon Valley and Shanxi Province relied on coal in the early stages of their
regional development. The abundance of coal in both regions allowed them to use coal-based
industries as their economic bases. They eventually developed along the coal-coke-iron and steel
supply chains, growing from mining into industrial regions that focused on manufacturing. As a
result of the industrial base and types of jobs these industries created, both regions had low
female labor-force participation during their economic booms. As the global metallurgical
markets became increasingly integrated, the two regions faced similar international competition
and global business climate. The concentration of one particular industry in the region exposes
both regions to the risks associated with the business cycle.
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In both the Shanxi cokemaking TVEs in the late 1990s and the Mon Valley steel mills in
the mid-1 980s, little attention was paid to workers' training and investment in human-capital
development. Related to this neglect on training and retaining expertise is the industries'
inability to attract the best and the brightest personnel. Robert McKersie (2002) sees this as a
crucial factor that precipitated the vulnerability of the Pennsylvania steel industry.
In both cases, labor is immobile. Labor was relatively "stuck" in the Mon Valley,
because their lack of transferable skills made it difficult for industrial workers to transfer into
other sectors of the economy. As a result, a large proportion of the workers who lost their jobs
during the mid-1980s in Pennsylvania never resumed employment. In Shanxi Province, labor is
"mobile" in the sense that the informal nature of employment and corporate ownership allow
workers to switch between the cokemaking and farming sectors. However, workers in Shanxi
Province are "stuck" in the Province, or even in their towns and villages, for two reasons. First,
the hukou system in China restricts the flow of rural population to urban or other rural areas.
Second, villagers are tied to their homeland through familial and social ties (and maintained and
reinforced through the practice of guanxi).
Differences
The first difference between the two case studies is that they cover two very different
times periods: the growth of Shanxi Province had just begun when the Mon Valley was de-
industrializing. The Mon Valley case focused on a region well on its way to de-industrialization
after having boomed; the Shanxi case describes a region that has just begun its industrialization
process, with a young industry and labor force.
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Industry structures and market characteristics differ in the two regions. The few large
Mon Valley steel companies were vertically integrated along the supply chain to maximize
control and economies of scale, but at the same time this vertical integration rendered them more
inflexible and irresponsive to external shocks (Chapter 3). In Shanxi Province, cokemaking
TVEs are small and numerous, and are, for the large part, separate from steel production. This
difference could be due to conscious business decision-making, where management in Shanxi
Province cokemaking TVEs opts for horizontal expansion instead of vertical integration, or just
due to geography and regional endowments. The lack of water transport in China makes
producing steel in an inland province, such as Shanxi Province, unfavorable. This is because
heavy goods (such as steel) can often be transferred less expensively by water than by road. The
two industries also reside in two very different institutional landscapes. China in the late-
1990s/early 2000s is an industrializing country transitioning from a socialist, command-and-
control economic system to a more open, market-oriented economy. The United States in the
mid-to-late-1980s was a full-grown capitalist economy. As such, workers and managers from
the two cases have had extremely different experiences, expectations, and outlooks.
Furthermore, the two countries have very different cultural and social norms, resulting in
divergent management philosophies and subsequent labor practices and labor relations.
Ownership structures of firms in the two regions differ. Mon Valley's integrated steel
mills were owned by industrialists and capitalists, such as the Carnegie family. Ownership is
defined, and these firms are the pinnacles of professionally managed, formal corporations. The
dichotomy between the proletariat workers and the owner-management elite accounted for some
of the tension in labor relations in the region. On the other side of the world, cokemaking TVEs
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are, by definition, under shared ownership. In recent years, however, there has been a shift
towards private and shareholding ownership of TVEs.
The set-up of the TVEs represents a drastically different definition of the "company
town" from that in the Mon Valley. The township/village communities in this case actually own
the enterprises collectively (though in varying degrees, as is evident in empirical data). The
make-up of the communities is also different between Shanxi Province and the Mon Valley. The
population growth in the Mon Valley was mostly a consequence of the regional economic
growth. The steel boom attracted many immigrant workers to the Mon Valley, which was
largely comprised of immigrant communities from divergent backgrounds (Hovanec, 2001). In
contrast, an excess of agricultural labor fueled rural Shanxi Province's economy (Chapter 5). In
addition, the power dynamics in the two regions differ. In the Mon Valley, workers fought and
struggled for more than just wage and benefit increases (Chapter 3). They were also standing up
for their values. Antagonistic relations might end up affecting the regional economy negatively,
but they were an expression of the power, free will, and rights of the workers. In Shanxi
Province, when I hypothesize that harmonious relations provide a favorable environment for
economic growth, I fail to examine the issue of power. It is unclear how much actual power
current rural industrial workers in China possess.
Labor Market Implications of the Shanxi Province Heresies
Shanxi Province industrial TVEs followed development paths that are different from
those in the Mon Valley. This has implications on the infant rural Chinese labor markets. First,
the oligopolistic Mon Valley steel industry favored the bargaining power of steelmakers, who
can exert downward pressure on labor wages. In theory, the more competitive Shanxi Province
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cokemaking sector should foster labor efficiency and fair wages based on productivity.
However, this is not evident in the Shanxi Province coke sector.
Second, product diversification among cokemaking TVEs strengthens the resilience of
the region. Such an economy not only provides job security for workers, but also creates an
interesting type of internal labor market within the TVEs. This internal labor market can be
good for labor for various reasons. First, job security is ensured when workers can switch from
one industry to another, and they are no longer completely dependent on the health of one sector.
Second, workers can expand their skills set by shuttling between industries, and they are not
limited to working in one narrow market. Third, management is more likely to train workers in
general skills, such as reading, writing, accounting, driving, etc., that can apply across the
enterprises' various business endeavors. A potentially negative impact of such diversification
and shuffling of workers and skills, however, is that labor is reduced to being just another
substitutable input for production. This contrasts with the view of work as a right, as an enabling
process, or as a means to build up human capital. Also, creating horizontal mobility through
such an internal labor market may take away from any potential vertical (i.e., upward) mobility.
Labor relations play out in both regions with the company town as the backdrop. The
workers' mentality and attachments towards the company and the town affect labor relations. In
Chapter 3, I discussed how the nature of the company towns created a sense that steel companies
"owned" the towns, and it bred a sense of fatality and resentment among the residents. The
population in Shanxi Province is indigenous, and the people working in township and village
enterprises have long been farmers and residents of the towns and villages. TVES are relatively
similar to communes, compared to the steel communities in the Mon Valley where the towns
followed the steel corporation's hierarchical organization of decentralization, subdivision, and
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separation. Such organization of was supplemented by the belief that what was good for the
companies must be good for the communities (Hoerr, 1988). Different conceptualizations of the
company towns could lead to very different relationships between the workers and residents at
large and the entrepreneurs and managers. Whereas Mon Valley residents felt hostility towards
the companies that were located in their communities and were determined to stymie the smooth-
running of the industries, local governments and communities in rural China have stakes in the
well-being of their enterprises. By having ownership of the companies, residents and
communities are likely to feel vested in the company, and they would want to cooperate with
businesses (managers, entrepreneurs, etc.) in fostering a competitive regional economy. The fact
that Shanxi Province TVE coke workers share a common heritage, community, and familial ties
offers an alternative to the Western-norm of work and community. In the United States, for
example, people tend to have to shuttle between two "lives": the working life, and the
community life. People are detached from their workplace after they leave, thus work remains a
place that is somewhat impersonal and formal. The TVE setup offers a bridge between these two
"lives" that people have and merges them into one. Just as people strive for harmonious
community and kindred relations, this set-up might encourage amicable work and labor relations
as well.
Comparing TVEs with SOEs
Just as the Mon Valley steel region is not a viable counterfactual for the Shanxi Province
coke region, neither are cokemaking SOEs a plausible counterfactual for cokemaking TVEs.
Based on our interviews with plant managers, I find that most TVE workers would remain on the
farms had they not joined the TVE workforce, and they are likely to return to their farms should
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they leave the TVEs. SOE employment is barely an option for these first-generation industrial
workers. Therefore, it may make more sense to evaluate the TVEs' work conditions and their
impact on developing human capital vis a vis agricultural employment, and not vis a vis SOEs.
Nonetheless, the comparison between TVEs and SOEs is justified when taking into account the
rapid agricultural reforms and industrialization in the Chinese countryside. As the region
develops, more and more people are likely to leave farms for industrial jobs, and TVEs will
become more prominent economic entities in the Chinese economy.
Review of Methodology
The design of this study has its shortcomings. I first describe how the methodology falls
short in providing reliable and adequate information for the scope of my hypotheses, and then
highlight key assumptions that I make in my analyses. There is room for improvement to this
study in order to examine issues surrounding labor and regional growth in the context of Chinese
TVEs sufficiently and comprehensively. However, appropriate discussions of issues such as
human rights, workers' power, and institutional evolution of TVEs are beyond the current scope
of this study.
Critique of the Research Methodology
For the Mon Valley example, I rely mostly on secondary sources, and I base my analyses
heavily on existing literature. Although I try to be as expansive as I can in my research, and be
as inclusive as I can in my setting forth of facts and viewpoints, it is entirely likely that such
literature is biased. This is because authors who devoted energy to the labor issues in the steel
industry probably felt strongly about the issue were therefore initially biased.
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Given the lack of reliable and published data, the four empirical AGS coke plant surveys
and several site visits to Shanxi Province cokemaking facilities were valuable and instrumental
for my study. However, they were initially conducted with a different focus, and they lacked a
lot of helpful data for my particular research objective. Therefore, the information gathered is
not optimal for the types of analyses that I proposed in this study. Future studies relating
regional growth and labor practices should have a more directed set of survey questions and
more comprehensive and critical examination of the actual facilities.
Finally, the "protagonists" are missing from the two stories that I told. I did not directly
interview workers. Their versions of the stories are not recorded, except indirectly. This
omission is partly a function of time and resources (the lack thereof), but mostly a result of
technical difficulties. Because I focus on the Mon Valley experience in the 1980s, most of the
workers who participated in the union and steel-making activities have retired; and many of the
mills are no longer in operation. For the Shanxi Province case study, I did not have the time nor
funds to conduct a set of structured interviews with the workers. Even so, I did visit the sites
with the Alliance for Global Sustainability (AGS) research team and attempted to talk with
workers whenever possible. Unfortunately, my efforts were not very successful. One difficulty
is that most workers at the plants were working and could not leave their positions and duties for
interviews. Moreover, workers were often wary of a stranger (in this case a researcher from
abroad) asking them questions regarding their backgrounds, their perception of the workplace,
and the management.
Assumptions
My hypothesis of TVEs being able to foster positive labor relations rests heavily on the
presumption that social capital is influential and in abundance in rural China. Although other
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analysts have researched and written on the importance of social capital in rural China, I take this
premise as given. However, just how much social capital is there in the Shanxi towns and
villages, and how are managers and workers governed and affected by it? I have no way of
telling. In order to make this a more empirically robust project, I would first have to develop
criteria and benchmarks by which to measure social capital; then, I would need to implement
such a measurement both at the enterprise level and in rural towns and villages, to gain an
understanding of the nature and dynamics of social interactions among industrialists, workers,
managers, and the communities.
I have treated TVEs as one form of firm, when, in fact, there is a high degree of
heterogeneity within this category of firms. These companies fall into a wide range along
ownership, scale, scope, location, and industrial experience dimensions. Furthermore, these
companies, and the official definition of a TVE itself, are constantly mutating and evolving. It is
therefore advisable that readers do not over-generalize from the analyses I have made.
Also, I make the bold assumption that the absence of complaints, strikes, and antagonism
are signs of harmonious labor relations in Shanxi Province's cokemaking TVEs. In reality, this
may be more a manifestation of the power balance in the coke plants. Due to the infancy of the
rural Chinese labor markets and the foreignness of the unionization concept that we take for
granted in the United States, Chinese workers appear to be relatively silenced. The harmony and
cooperation at the TVEs may be an indication of worker' lack of a voice and channel through
which workers can express their discontent. No analysis of regional development and labor
issues can be complete without mentioning the role of power and the avenue through which
people can make their own decisions and can actively shape their lives.
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Future Research Implications
Labor relations constitute a crucial factor in ensuring successful and sustainable regional
growth. In this light, studies such as this warrant attention and energy. In addition to refining
the survey instrument and research methodologies, future research projects may include
dissecting power dynamics in the rural Chinese labor markets, or looking at the changes in labor
relations and practices along with institutional changes.
Looking Ahead
The second part of the conclusion of the study points to the issues to take note of in
Shanxi Province's TVE cokemaking sector. Much of what I have discussed in this study have
implications on policies, institutional reforms, and human-resource management. The lessons
from this study are valuable as Shanxi Province, China, and the rest of the regions in the world
grow and develop. A number of growth strategy decisions await Shanxi Province. These
decisions include (1) whether or not the region should diversify its industry base; and (2)
whether TVEs as an ownership and institutional norm should persist in the long run. These
decisions have implications that are multidimensional. I speculate about the impacts of growth
on (1) labor markets; (2) management; and (3) communities and society at large. Despite the
salience of these issues, substantiated discussions or detailed evidence of these impacts are
beyond the scope of this current study. In conclusion, I reiterate that although developing
countries can learn from the experiences of their more development counterparts, such as the
Mon Valley case, the more advanced economies can also benefit from the examples of the
Shanxi Province cokemaking TVEs.
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Labor Market Implications
The growth of Shanxi Province cokemaking TVEs can affect the labor market in the
areas of workers' training and labor relations. Diversification can potentially reduce workers'
role to a factor input, easily substitutable across sectors and highly elastic depending on industry
needs. Bargaining power of workers is stripped when specialized workers can only enjoy the
upper hand at the bargaining table when their skills and expertise cannot be easily replaced.
While ensuing job security and preserving the number of jobs in the Province, business
diversification can negatively affect the quality of the jobs. However, if the culture of guanxi
and social obligations persists among TVEs, the diversification of business ventures can have
positive impacts on workers. When labor is immobile, it becomes beneficial for the enterprises to
train their workers in general skills, such as reading, accounting, driving, using computers, etc.
and be assured that the investment in human capital is retained within the firm (Osterman, 2002).
This can potentially result in a more efficient workforce for the firm, better education and
personal fulfillment for the workers, and a more flexible labor force for the region to withstand
industrial restructuring and future shocks.
Implications for Management
As TVEs grow in size and scope, the current set-up and rules of the financial and
economic institutions may not sufficiently equip them to compete globally (IFC, 2000). As
formal labor, capital, and commodity markets develop in the Chinese countryside, there may be a
decreased reliance on personal relationships and social ties for success and smooth operations.
To thrive in more open, competitive markets, many private enterprises will need to upgrade the
capacity and skills of their managers. Lastly, the accumulation of skills and expertise is crucial in
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promoting the long-term success of a region in a globalized economy. In order for TVEs to
remain competitive in the global economy, they must expand their technological and managerial
capacities.
When business operations and management are no longer handled by the family or
farmer entrepreneur, will the unique social embeddedness and harmonious labor relations that
have contributed to the success of the TVEs be undermined? I maintain that if TVEs can harness
well their rich endowments of social capital and flexibilities, they can safeguard their
competitive advantage. Up-skilling, however, can have adverse effects. The switch to
professional management, or hiring outside managers to the TVEs may expose TVEs to the
antagonism highlighted in the Mon Valley story. However, as firms increasingly compete in a
skills economy, labor relations will become an important means of retaining necessary skills in
the labor market. Attention to labor relations is important for intellectual, ideological, and
pragmatic reasons.
Social Implications
Industry reforms and economic growth can also have social implications. The rapid
proliferation of cokemaking plants on the farmlands in Shanxi Province not only transformed
farmers into industrial workers, it also created a managerial class that had not existed previously
in the countryside. With the growth of TVEs, incomes, responsibilities, and experiences diverge
within the towns and villages. Potential conflicts and tensions may arise, and may challenge the
traditional social relations, guanxi, and ways of life.
Unger (2002) claims that a decline in social capital in today's societies undermines and
impedes the development of a democratic social regime. In that case, I imagine that China's
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countryside, where social capital in the form of guanxi is plentiful, not only encourages favorable
labor relations, but also represents a great opportunity for democratization and true democracy.
The Flip Side
In this study, I have attempted to show how the institutional contexts of Chinese TVE
creates opportunities for labor relations and practices that favor regional economic resilience. Of
course, omissions exist in the analyses and counter-arguments are plausible. For example,
although I have hypothesized that guanxi networks create an environment in which management
and workers can get along harmoniously, guanxi can also be exploited and abused. In the name
of preserving cordial social order, workers may be pressured to accept the status quo, despite it
being repressive and exploitative at times. Ironically, the abundance of social capital in this case
can reinforce exploitation, allowing companies to benefit from low wages and low benefits. In
addition, guanxi among industrialists and entrepreneurs makes it easy for them to collude. Such
collusion can essentially turn the coking industry into a monopoly. This can potentially translate
into labor-market distortions, which benefit the industries, but render workers helpless and dis-
empowered. Unfortunately, thorough examination of such issues and alternative hypotheses is
beyond the current scope of this study.
Concluding Remarks
What are the lessons learned from Shanxi cokemaking TVEs? The role of TVEs and
their labor practices fall into a debate surrounding institutional convergence in development.
The crux of the debate lies in whether national institutions have to converge to some prototypical
form in order for countries to develop economically and in order to have an integrated world
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economy. In economics textbooks in the West, "success" takes the forms of free markets, secure
and well-defined property rights, and representative democracy, etc. But as an analyst digs a
little deeper, s/he also finds that the rise and boom of regional economies are often mired in class
conflicts and adversarial industrial labor relations. TVEs offer an alternative to organizing
market economies and another model of management-labor relations. The accomplishments of
the township and village enterprises in rural China challenge the Western understanding of what
necessitates regional growth and economic success. This study has shown that the institutional
heresies in the rural labor market in China, such as a high degree of informality, an abundance of
social capital, and family management, etc., have precisely contributed to the success of the
TVEs.
There is room for experimental labor relations. Currently, the Western concept of
organized labor does not exist in China. The hope is that Chinese workers, such as the ones at
the Shanxi cokemaking TVEs, will eventually gain a voice and be able to stand up for their
rights. However, I propose that they do so without following the confrontational footsteps of
their Western counterparts. The deep-seeded culture of guanxi and emphasis on long-term
harmonious relationships should allow Chinese management and workers to come up with a
cooperative forum of interactions. This is certainly something that U.S. management and
workers can observe. Despite the political freedom to organize, unionization has dropped in the
United States, and low-wage, low-skilled workers are often left without a channel to fend for
themselves. According to Unger, the current state of management-labor relations actually
undermines the spirit of democracy:
Episodic unionization is likely to reinforce the pre-existing segmentation of labor
force when it takes place in the setting of a starkly hierarchical social division of
labor. Skilled workers in the capital-intensive sectors of industry will ordinarily
have greater bargaining power.
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The contractualistic labor-law regime favors a middle-level, economistic style of
labor militancy. Such a style of militancy focuses upon wages, benefits and job
security rather than upon the organization of the firm and the economy. The
assimilation of labor relations to private contract conceals the political
constitution of labor relations, helping to push the political economy of work just
beyond reach of active and conscious response by workers. (Unger, 1998, p.
224)
He further suggests that the development of labor rights ought to be growth-friendly:
They must help moderate the conflict between two great social requirements of
the material progress of society: the acceptance of innovation and the disposition
to cooperate. For economic growth to occur, people must cooperate: most
notably, workers with workers, and workers with managers, but also firms with
firms and businesses with governments. People must also, however, innovate and
accept innovation. The problem is that every innovation threatens to change the
relative positions and advantages of the cooperators by altering the context of
practices, expectations, and rights in which their cooperation is embedded. We
must therefore prefer those ways of organizing cooperation that minimize the
conflict between the requirements of cooperation and innovation. The partnership
principle- arrangements for sharing of profits and ownership with workers- has
just this attribute. (Unger, 1998, p.224)
A symbiotic relationship exists between regional growth and labor welfare. Unger's
insights and suggestions may point towards an alternative, for both developing and
developed countries, to achieve sustainable success on both counts.
In the societies that we live in today, we spend a majority of our waking life at work, at
the work place, and with other workers. Ensuring healthy, positive, and empowering workplace
and labor relations is therefore important for ideological, political, economic, social, and
pragmatic reasons. I have demonstrated that both China and the United States have a long ways
to go before labor relations are close to optimal. A change in norms and expectations ought to
take place. With a bit of imagination and the courage to experiment, however, I believe that
positive labor relations can emerge to sustain the growth of human capital, communities,
industries, and regions.
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MAPS
Map 1: LOCATION OF SURVEYED SAMPLE OF COKEMAKING PLANTS
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Source: AGS China Cokemaking Project TVE Survey 2000, compiled by Yan Chen.
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Map 2: SHANXI PROVINCE AND CHINA
Source: www.rom.on.ca/pub/unicom/ graphics/unimap2f.gif
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Figure 3.1: U.S. STEEL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey-Minerals Yearbook (MYB);
Mineral Resources of the United States (MR), Mineral Commodity Summaries (MCS); Com-
modity Data Summaries (CDS); Metal Prices in the United States through 1998 (MP98).
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Figure 3.2: U.S. STEEL MILLS PRODUCTION WORKERS' HOURLY EARNINGS VS. VALUE ADDED,
1977- 1992
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Figure 5.1: VALUE ADDED OF INDUSTRIES IN SHANXI PROVINCE, 1992- 2000
(PERCENT OF TOTAL VALUE ADDED IN THE PROVINCE)
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Figure 5.2: URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION IN SHANXI PROVINCE, 1952- 2000
(PERCENT)
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Figure 5.3: SHANXI PROVINCE STAFF AND WORKERS (ALL SECTORS) EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND
FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, COMPARED WITH THE REST OF CHINA, 1998
(PERCENT OF ALL STAFF AND WORKERS)
- El National Average N Shanxi Province Average
25%
-- 22%
40%
30% 4-
20% -
10% -
0% -
Female
Participation
Female labor force participation and Education
4%
Junior High High Schoo
School
5%/5% 4%
Technical
School
Higher
Technical
School
Level
College and
Higher
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Nianjian-in Chinese]. China Agricultural Press, Beijing, China.
Note: Total number of staff and workers in Shanxi Province TVEs was 1.3 million in 1998,
compared to the national total of 48.3 million
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Figure 5.4: EMPLOYMENT IN SHANXI PROVINCE BY ENTERPRISE OWNERSHIP, 1952- 2000
(MILLION PERSONS)
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Source: Shanxi Statistical Yearbook. 2001. China Statistics Press: Beijing, China
Notes: There has been a decline in total employment in Shanxi Province in recent years, exact
reasons for the decline are unknown.
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Figure 5.5: Average WAGES OF EMPLOYEES IN SHANXI PROVINCE AND NATIONAL TVEs , 1998
(NOMINAL RMB)
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E National Averagre ShniAverage
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4200
T\E Average Collectively Owned Privately Owned mIdividually Owned
Ownership Type
Source: Chinese Township and Village Enterprises Yearbook. 1999. [Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye
Nianjian-in Chinese]. China Agricultural Press, Beijing, China.
Notes: (1) RMB= Renminbi;
(2) Nominal RMB values refer to the face value of the RMB in 1998.
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Figure 5.6: Average WAGES OF EMPLOYEES IN SHANXI PROVINCE AND NATIONAL TVEs , 2000
(NOMINAL RMB)
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units
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 2001. State
Notes: (1) RMB= Renminbi;
Statistical Bureau: Beijing, China.
(2) Nominal RMB values refer to the face value of the RMB in 1998.
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AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AT SURVEYED SHANXI COKEMAKING
(EMPLOYEES PER PLANT)
TVEs, 1995- 2000
300
Average I
2,50
10
100 A 1Mode
N=164
0
Year
Source: AGS China Coke Project TVE Survey 2000
Notes: (1) Average= Total Number of Employees Among All TVEs surveyed/Total Number of
TVEs Surveyed; (2) Median refers to the number of employees at the plant in the middle of the
distribution when all plants surveyed are ranked by their number of employees; (3) Mode refers
to the most common level of employment among all the plants surveyed.
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Figure 5.7:
1998 1999 20001-995 19)96
Figure 5.8: SHANXI COKEMAKING EMPLOYEES IN FIVE SURVEYED REGIONS, 1995- 2001
(PERSONS)
o Cokemalng TVE Employees
Year 1995 1996 1997 199 1999 20
Year
Source: AGS China Coke Project SOE Survey, 2001
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Figure 5.9: PICTURE OF EMPLOYEEs DINING AT COMPANY CAFETERIA
Source: Author, taken during field visit, Summer 2001.
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Figure 5.10: EMPLOYEE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
1998 (TVE), 2000 (TVE) AND 2001 (SOE)
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Source: AGS Coke Project TVE Surveys 1998 and 2000; AGS China Coke Project SOE Survey,
2001
Note: The percentages represent the proportion of plants surveyed which indicated that their staff
received the depicted years of schooling.
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Figure 5.11 EMPLOYEE TRAINING
1998 (TVE), 2000 (TVE) AND 2001 (SOE)
Source: AGS Coke Project TVE Surveys 1998 and 2000; AGS China Coke Project
2001
SOE Survey,
Note: The percentages represent the proportion of plants surveyed which indicated that their staff
received the depicted length of training
134
Length of Training
100% -
80% -
* Others
60% 0 One Month
13 One Week
40 One Day
4 None
20%
0) C=) CD0M CO C)C) CD C3M C= C
C14 C4 C4 r-'4 C14 ~
Production Technical Staff Admin Staff
Workers
Employee Category
Figure 5.12: PICTURE OF PRODUCTION WORKERS WEARING HARD HATS
Source: Author, taken during field visit, Summer 2001.
Figure 5.13: PICTURE OF PHYSICAL REMINDERS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY
Source: Dr. Karen R. Polenske, taken during field visit, Summer 2001.
135
Figure 5.14: FoRms OF TVE OWNERSHIP, 1998
(N= 158)
Source: AGS China Coke Project TVE Survey, 1998.
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Figure 5.15: TVE OWNERSHIP By FOUNDING YEAR OF PLANT, 1983- 2000
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Source: AGS China Coke Project Surveys, 1998, 1999 and 2000, compiled by Yabei Zhang.
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Figure 5.16: ANNUAL PER CAPITA EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AGAINST PLANT OWNERSHIP,
TVE (1998)
1,000 Nominal RMB
All PX 75 89-1 89-11 91 97 SJ-96 ZC-96 2H-II
Oven Type (Low to High Technologies)
Source: AGS China Coke Project Survey, 1998.
Notes: (1) RMB= Renminbi;
(2) Nominal RMB values refer to the face value of the RMB in 1998.
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Figure 5.17: Oven Technologies and Employee Compensation Cost,
TVE (1998)
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Source: AGS China Coke Project Survey, 1998.
Notes: (1) RMB= Renminbi;
(2) Nominal RMB values refer to the face value of the RMB in 1998.
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Table 5.1: SHANXI PROVINCE AND NATIONAL PETROLEUM PROCESSING AND COKING TVE EMPLOYMENT,
1995-1998
1995 19961 1997 1998
Shanxi Petro Processing and
Coking (employees) 9,478 90,524 86,205 75,660
Enterprises (units) 1,428 1,306 1,314 907
Average Number of Employees
(per work unit) 66 69 65 83
National Petro Processing and
Coking (employees) 212,386 208,180 180,149 158,006
Enterprises (units) 4,796 4,351 3,792 2,682
Average Number of Employees
(per work unit) 44 48 48 59
Source: Chinese Township and Village Enterprises Yearbook. 1996- 1999. [Zhongguo Xiangzhen
Qiye Nianjian-in Chinese]. China Agricultural Press, Beijing, China.
Table 5.2: Composition of TVE and SOE Workforce, 1995, 2000 and 2001
(PLANT LEVEL AVERAGE)
Production Technical Administrative
Workers (%) Staff (%) Staff (%) Total (%)
TVE- 1995 78 8 11 100
TVE- 2000 78 8 10 100
SOE- 1995 74 17 8 100
SOE- 2001 78 9 7 100
Source: AGS China Coke Project SOE Survey, 2001
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Table 5.3: EMPLOYEE TENURE
1998 (TVE), 2000 (TVE) AND 2001 (SOE)
1 Year or 1 to 5 5 or More
Less (%) Years (%) Years (%)
Production Workers 18 57 23
TVE- 1998 Tehnical Staff 6 51 37
Administrative Staff 6 51 36
Production Workers 13 46 29
TVE- 2000 Tehnical Staff 5 41 40
Administrative Staff 3 36 46
Production Workers 10 37 25
SOE- 2001 Tehnical Staff 6 35 45
Administrative Staff 6 29 49
Source: AGS China Coke Project TVE Surveys 1998 and 2000
Note: The percentages represent the proportion of TVEs surveyed which
indicated that their staff had worked in the industry for the depicted length
of time
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Table 5.4: EMPLOYEE SAFETY (PERCENT ADOPTING MEASURE),
1998 (TVE), 2000 (TVE) AND 2001 (SOE)
Safety Hard Eye Fire First-Aid Other
Instructions Shoes Goggles Extinguisher Kit
TVE- 1998 79 68 77 60 43 32 9
TVE- 2000 91 76 66 61 51 41 7
SOE- 2001 96 98 78 67 71 49 n/a
Source: AGS China Coke Project TVE Surveys, 1998 and 200; AGS China Coke Project SOE
Survey, 2001
Table 5.5: INCIDENCE OF SAFETY MEASURE ADOPTION
TVE (2000)
Number of Safety Number of Percent of Total
Measures Used Plants (N- 164)
0 9 5%
1 7 4%
2 10 6%
3 30 18%
4 39 24%
5 43 26%
6 23 14%
7 3 2%
Source: AGS China Coke Project TVE Survey, 2000
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Table 5.6: TVE Ownership and Adoption of Safety Measures
TVE (2000)
Township Village Jointly Self I Share- Rent/
Owned Owned Owned Owned holding Lease Others
Mean 4.61 4.1 3.5 4.0 4 .0' 4.0 5.5
Median __ __ 5! _ __ 5 _4 45
Mode 5 5 4 3 5 N/A
N= 11: 16 6 67 51 10, 4
Source: AGS China Coke Project TVE Surveys, 1998 and 2000; AGS China Coke Project SOE
Survey, 2001.
Notes: (1) Mean= Total Number of Employees Among All TVEs surveyed/Total Number of
TVEs Surveyed; (2) Median refers to the number of employees at the plant in the middle of the
distribution when all plants surveyed are ranked by their number of employees; (3) Mode refers
to the most common level of employment among all the plants surveyed.
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Table 5.7: CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP OVER TIME, 1998- 2000
(31 COMMON PLANTS)
Ownership in 1998 Ownership in 2000 (number of plants)
(number of plants)
Township (2) Village (1) Joint (1) Self (12) Rent/Lease (0), Shareholding (12)
Township (3) 1 1 1
Village (1) 1 -
Joint (2) 2
Self (12) 1 1 6 4
Rent/Lease (1) 1
Shareholding (9) 1 2 6
Source: AGS China Coke Project TVE Surveys, 1998 and 2000.
Table 5.8: ASSET-EMPLOYMENT TRADEOFF-- EMPLOYMENT LEVEL
TVE (2000)
Increased Decreased
Type of Expansion Employment Employment
Expanded Plant
-Number of Plants 33 5
Median Level of Employemnt in 1995 150 289
Adopted New Equipment
- Number of Plants 24 1
Median Level of Employemnt in 1995 145 218
Adoptted New Technology
-Number of Plants 19 2
- Median Level of Employemnt in 1995 130 179
Source: AGS China Coke Project Survey, 2000.
Notes: Median Level of Employment refers to the employment level of the plant in the middle of
the distribution when plants in the specified category are ranked by the number of employees.
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Table 5.9: Asset-Employment Tradeoff- Fixed Assets on Employee Training
TVE (2000)
Fixed Assets Training of Production Staff
Investment in 2000 Number of None i Day 1 Week I Month Others
(Million RMB) Plants(100%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
0-100 22 9 9 50 18' 0
101-200 16 0 0 50 50 8
201- 300 10 10 10 30 50 10
301-400 13 0 0 54 38 8
401-500 11 0 0 45 557 0
501-1000 20 5 0 30 60 5
1001-1500 8 0 13 50 38' 0
1501-2000 7, 0 0 291 43 0
2001 -5000 14 0 0 33 50 17
5001 and up 13 0 0 50 38 0
All 164 0 20 20 40 20
Source: AGS China Coke Project Survey, 2000.
Table 5.10: Asset-Employment Tradeoff- Total Capital on Employee Training
TVE (2000)
Training of Production Staff
Total Capital in 2000 Numberof None I Day I Week I Month Others
(million RMB) Plants (100%) (% (%) (%) (% (%)
0-200 17 12 41 24 0
201-300 12 0 0 42 58 0
301-500 144 7 0 50 36 14
501-1000 11 9, 0 55| 36 0
1001-1500 10 0, 0 60, 30, 20
1501-2500 15 0 7 20 67 0
1501-2000 6 0 0 33 67 0
2001 -2500 9 0 0 11 67 0
2501- 5000 10 0 0 40 40 10
5001- 10000 12 0 0 331 58 0
10001 and up 10 0i 10 60 0 30
Al 64 4 4' 41 37 7
Source: AGS China Coke Project Survey, 2000.
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